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An Evaluation of Anti-phishing Solutions 
 
Arinze Bona-Umeaku 
 
Abstract 
Phishing as an online threat has resulted in the development of currently available 
anti-phishing solutions. Most of these solutions are automated web-based tools that 
warn users against phishing sites and protect users from third party invasion on 
their details when accessing a genuine website. In this paper we closely evaluate 
the performance of a web content system and a password protection system using 
documented evidence to summarize findings and offer a proposed solution.  
 
1 Introduction 
One of the major internet threats is phishing. 
Phishing which has turned out to be a major 
problem in the advancement of e-commerce 
bringing doubts to the minds of customers on 
the use of internet as a business tool. It has been 
noticed that phishing attacks progressively 
increases year after year, (Chen et al. 2011) this 
has also been seen in more recent attacks against 
Sony‟s Play station network and Epsilon. This 
has resulted in several businesses and 
organisations investing substantial amount of 
research to find lasting solution (APWG, 2011). 
For example companies like Cyveillance anti-
phishing is dedicated to providing anti-phishing 
solutions to organisations to enable them 
prevent, detect and recover from phishing 
attacks. Some software vendors offer toolbars 
that help users identify genuine sites (Zhang et 
al. 2007).  
 
In this paper we evaluate methods that have 
been proposed through series of research and 
how they have performed towards the anti-
phishing crusade. Among other methods 
mentioned here we would take a close look at 
two systems, a content web-based automated 
system and an authentication system that 
prevents a preset password. After which a 
practical solution from evaluations made, based 
on tangible evidence, implementation and tests 
that has been carried out in previous research 
papers. 
2 Web Content Systems 
2.1 Anti-phishing Toolbars  
In respect to this paper where we evaluate 
automated phishing solution, research has been 
done in the area of automated anti-phishing 
detection solution for example the spoofguard 
(Zhang et al. 2007) which checks the website for 
certain characteristics like the host name, 
traceable spoofing techniques and checking 
against previously marked images. Various  
software vendors have developed anti-phishing 
tool bars that identify a page as a phishing site 
or legitimate site using methods of blacklisting 
(list of fake websites), whitelisting (list of 
genuine websites) and user ratings (Cao et al. 
2008). Some of such examples are outlined 
below; Google makes available the source code 
for the safe browsing feature and claims that it 
cross-checks URLs against a blacklist. E-bay 
also developed a toolbar that uses both 
heuristics and blacklists to identify fraudulent 
URLs, It was also developed in a way were 
users can report newly identified fraudulent 
sites. In internet explorer Microsoft also 
embedded a phishing filter which uses heuristics 
as well as depends largely on the blacklist 
hosted by Microsoft and option for users to 
report suspected sites. The Netcraft toolbar 
which was built to use a log of blacklisted 
websites hosted by Netcraft and a list of sites 
identified by users but confirmed by Netcraft. 
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Having evaluated this using publicly available 
information provided by the toolbar download 
websites (APWG, 2011) it was discovered that 
majority of the tool bars mentioned above used 
blacklists to identify fraudulent sites, but not all 
were able to accurately identify phishing sites 
(Reddy, 2011). This could be as a result of the 
size of blacklist used by each toolbar therefore a 
list with more tagged and user updated sites will 
perform better than that with fewer list of 
phishing sites. Also the heuristics used could 
have been used to detect other sites that have not 
been put in the blacklist. Although spoofguard 
was the only tool bar that did not use blacklist 
instead it used heuristics still missed some 
phishing sites and had a high rate of false 
positive (genuine sites mistaken for fraudulent) 
this could probably be improved by the addition 
of whitelist (list of genuine sites) 
2.2 Automated Webpage Detector 
Meanwhile the solution Presented here by (He et 
al. 2011) is a heuristic solution to determine if a 
website is a genuine or a phishing page, based 
on its content, HTTP transaction and search 
engine results.  According to He et al (2011) this 
solution identifies phishing sites without using 
the blacklist  technique. This is done by 
converting a web page into 12 features which 
are selected based on exisiting normal and 
phishing page. This method claims to help users 
identify a phishing website before it is 
blacklisted or shutdown as is the case with the 
blacklist-based anti-phisihng toolbar mentioned 
above. Also claiming that the  solution is able to 
extract a webpage identity using the famous tf-
idf (frequency-in-verse document frequency) 
method and this identity would be the basis for 
determing a phishing or legitimate webpage 
using an SVM (support vector machine) 
classifier.   
 
Two different experiments were conducted 
using two different testing data-set to evalute the 
method. There are two metrics used to evalute 
the performance; true posititve(TP) rate and 
false posititve (FP) rate where the true positive 
rate measures the percentage of phishing site 
which correctly labeled as positive phishing and 
it is computed by (Figure 1) (He et al.  2011). 
 
Figure 1 
Where  is number of phishing 
pages which are rightly labelled as phishing, and 
is number of phishing pages. The 
higher TP value the better the detector.  While 
false positive rate measures the percentage of 
legitimate sites which are falsely labeled as 
positive phishing and it is computed by (Figure 
2) (He et al. 2011). 
 
  
Figure 2 
 
Where is number of 
legitimate pages which are wrongly labeled as 
phishing and  is number of 
legitimate pages(He et al. 2011). This means 
that when there is a lower FP value the betterr 
the detector. 
Experiment 1 
100 login pages of top targeted legitimate 
websites (He et al. 2011) were collected. 
Another 100 webpages consisting the following 
were collected; 
35 Homepage of top targeted websites, 35 Top 
pages, 30 Random pages from a list of 500 
pages used in  3Sharp‟s phishing study. (He et 
al. 2011)   
From the 200 legitimate and 325 phishing 
pages, 50 legitimate and 50 phishing pages as 
the training set. The 50 legitimate pages consist 
of: 
10 login pages of top targeted websites 
15 Homepages of top Alexa websites 
10 Homepage of top targeted websites 
15 pages from 3Sharp list. 
Therefore classification result is shown below 
as:  
True positive rate of the method is 97.33% and 
false positive rate is low at 1.45%. Although 
most of the phishing pages used here were 
already shutdown at the time of the test.  
Below is the graphical representation of the 
performance on the first dataset.  
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Figure 3 
Experiment 2 
Using the same training set as the first 
experiment the proposed detector is tested with 
a different set. 100 legitimate webpages are 
collected along with another 100 phishing pages 
from live phishing pages from phishTank 
(PhishTank). The legitimate webpages were also 
changed to evaluate the stability of the proposed 
detector (He et al. 2011). Below is a graphical 
reperesentation of the results when compared to 
other methods like CATINA (Zhang, 2007). 
 
 
           
Figure 4 
True Posititve comparison (He et al. 2011). 
 
 
         
Figure 5 
 False positive comparison (He et al. 2011)  
 
Having evaluated the webpage detector (method 
1) used to detect phishing sites  here, it was 
discovered it has some limitations which include 
that tf-Idf (frequency / inverse document 
frequency) does not work with other languages 
other than English so an Asian phishing site 
cannot be identified, according to the results 
done were gotten from only English data sets. 
And in the case of a false positive (legitimate 
web page that is detected as fake) a user will be 
misinformed. Another issue of this method is 
that it could suffer from performance problems 
due to the time lag involved in querying 
database, there were no experiments to represent 
timing. 
 
3 Authentication System  
3.1 One-Time Password 
Here we evaluate in details the solution 
proposed by Huang et al (2011). Here they 
introduce a solution that eliminates the 
possibility of a user having a preset password by 
leveraging on existing infrastructure on the 
internet –specifically the instant messaging 
service. The study also shows that the solution 
can uniformly integrate with openID service 
which will enable websites that support openID 
use the solution. Huang (2011) believes that 
using content based approach is limited in 
solving the phishing attack on websites “List-
based and heuristic-based methods cannot detect 
all phishing sites” Huang (2011, pp.1293) going 
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ahead to claim that heuristic-based mechanisms 
uses one criteria to assess web sites thereby 
bringing limitation for a list-based method to 
identify and prevent all phishing sites. Therefore 
claiming how possible it is to manage password 
phishing attack by delivering OTP via a 
secondary real-time channel also that this 
method is attack proof against IP-spoofing, safe  
authentication in an unfamiliar environment.  In 
this solution a user is given a one-time new 
password every time the user wants to access the 
web. It was designed such that a trusted 
secondary channel will be needed to 
communicate the password, in this case the 
instant messaging service.   
 
The one time password (OTP) will be 
communicated through a trusted secondary 
communication channel. There will be a user 
database in the server side and this will match 
with the user‟s matching identity on the 
secondary channel. Once person A wants to 
access a web service, an OTP is sent by the 
server to person A through the secondary 
channel. Person A is expected to use password 
within a space of time before it expires. One of 
the things the researchers claimed that is unique 
about this solution is that it provides three levels 
of security protection. An attack can occur only 
if the phisher knows I) account name; II) the 
secondary communication line were the user 
receives the OTP; III) password for secondary 
channel service. Huang et al (2011) decided to 
use instant message service as the best 
communication channel for the solution. This is 
majorly because it is cost effective as this can be 
downloaded and installed for free or is pre-
installed on most operating systems e.g. 
Microsoft‟s messenger (Microsoft corporation)  
Generally the website will need to setup an 
identity management database and run an IM 
bot program to send the one-time password 
solution. 
 
 
Figure 6 
 
The user registration process, the areas marked 
in red rectangle are the extra steps required for 
this solution. 
According to the researchers, for this solution to 
be implemented there are parties involved and 
assumptions used. For example it is assumed 
that the HTTP protocol for the IM is secure, this 
assumption is believed to be considerable 
(Huang, 2011) because a lot of commercial 
websites use the SSL protocol for encryption of 
HTTP. Another assumption was that the website 
has incorporated an instant messaging service. 
The user will have to install an (IM) service 
supported by the website. The parties involved 
are; websites, users, phishers and instant 
messaging (IM) service providers. There are two 
processes involved in this solution; 
Registration Process 
The registration is same with any other online 
registration process except for the two added 
section in order for the user to effectively use 
the solution. (as seen in Figure 7) Series of 
exchanges take place between the website. A) 
the page containing the IM account of the 
website and string t which is a session token 
with the space field were the OTP will be 
inputted B) If the account is new confirmation to 
add to database is obtained. C) When IM 
account is verified a message is sent to the user 
through the IM service. This message will 
contain the session token t and a one-time 
password p. (D) Finally the user confirms that 
IM account and token are same with previous 
page.  
 
 
Figure 7: The instant messaging registration 
process 
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Login Process 
As indicated in (figure 3) the login process 
comprises of five steps, A-E As an addition to 
the OTP field as requested by the website the 
page also contains a randomly generated session 
token t and the IP address used by the user. 
Once the account name is valid the website 
checks the user‟s IM account and sends an 
authentication message to the account. This 
message will contain the former generated 
session token t as well as the generated OTP p 
(In figure 4) shows a sample confirmation 
message. At the end of the process when the 
authentication message has been received the 
user can check the validity of this message by 
checking if the token t received by the IM client 
and the one shown on the OTP input page are 
same; If the user confirms the authentication 
message, the user supplies the OTP on the 
available OTP input page. When this is done the 
website has to confirm that the user has 
submitted the OTP from exactly the same IP 
address the user made a request to login from, 
then the website authenticates the user using the 
OTP entered if same as formerly assigned OTP 
i.e. if user enters p’ in the password field of the 
input page, then the login will be successful if p’ 
is the same as the OTP generated by the website. 
During the process of registration and login, the 
life span of the password is limited. This means 
that if a user inputs a wrong OTP more than a 
certain time n or a given OTP has not been used 
within m period of time, the website will 
invalidate the current password and stop 
process. In this case n has to be a very small 
number and m a short period of time for 
example n=3 and m=30s. Additionally each 
OTP will comprise of a variety of letters 
including upper/lower case and numerals to 
reduce probability guessing. 
 
Having evaluated the One-Time Password 
method (method 2) it is discovered that the OTP 
solution has a good mutual authentication 
feature were the server authenticates the user 
and the user authenticates the server. The OTP 
solution strength lies in the hidden relationships 
between three components and the fact that it is 
difficult (considering all assumptions made 
(Huang, 2011)) to compromise the components 
which are the user‟s account, the website‟s IM 
account and the user‟s Instant Messaging 
account. So claims made by Huang et al (2011) 
that the OTP solution can only be compromised 
if the attacker knows the components that are 
associated with each other and target them 
accordingly has no concrete evidence of 
implementation in the work done to prove this. 
The test method does not necessarily show that 
the method will always work on claims made 
also no substantial experiments where presented 
to considered the fact that the proposed solution 
can be compromised by the attacker if able to 
acquire the user‟s account name identity from a 
third party to log into the website and 
successfully making a user submit their OTP 
were is believed to be legitimate. 
 
 
Figure 8: User login process 
 
 
Figure 9: Example of authentication message 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper we have carefully evaluated a web 
content based and one-time password anti-
phishing solution. Although it may be 
impossible to completely wipe-out all phishing 
threats. The purpose of these solutions is to 
reduce the amount of phishing attack online. 
Having considered that the two major ways 
through which phishing attackers invade users 
are; having illegal authorisation into user 
account and deceptive website links. It would be 
recommended that using the automated webpage 
detector (method 1) as the major protection tool 
against phishing will be an effective way to 
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combat the phishing attack among businesses 
and social network sites. Based on the 
experiments carried-out on the webpage detector 
showing an average of 4-6% false positive 
which means that 1 out of every 10 phishing 
sites will be detected by the webpage detector as 
against the previous research done by (Zhang et 
al 2007) on phishing toolbar that uses the 
blacklist method showing a false positive of 15-
20%. However the one-time password solution 
(method 2) compliments (method 1). If an 
attacker eventually succeeds in tricking a user 
into using a fake website, the authentication 
process will identify the phishing attack 
considering that the user will need to be 
assigned a one-time password after 
authentication confirmations are made from both 
ends. This method also has a reduced cost of 
deployment to almost zero by the installation of 
instant messaging bots at server side only. 
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A Detailed Analysis of Current Biometric Research Aimed at  
Improving Online Authentication Systems 
 
Daniel Brown 
 
Abstract 
One of the biggest problems with all online systems in this day and age, is 
security. Many security measures are implemented across various systems and 
throughout time we find that as technology advances, secure systems soon 
become exploited.  In this paper the use of biometrics within online security will 
be analysed, looking at iris, fingerprint and facial recognition. From this, the 
efficiency and reliability of biometrics as an authentication method for online 
systems will be evaluated. The main vulnerabilities of biometric systems are how 
accurate this method is and the way in which data is transmitted from biometric 
devices to a secure authentication server. This paper looks at factors which could 
potentially affect the interpretation of key features by the biometric devices and 
will assess the overall security of biometric systems.  
 
1 Introduction 
For some time now, the technology industry has 
been searching for a method of security that will 
be impossible to compromise and with the 
integration of biometric systems into security we 
seemed to potentially have a solution. Already 
we have began to see biometric systems present 
in airports, in which your passport is scanned 
and vital measurements are taken such as the 
distance between several distinct features and 
Iris scanning takes place to verify the identity of 
the person standing before the system. It would 
seem impossible to deceive such systems 
however we cannot rule out the possibility that 
these systems are not 100% accurate and if they 
are not, what is the chance of a false rejection or 
even a false acceptance.  
2 Biometric Systems 
2.1 Fingerprint Recognition  
Basic fingerprint security has been available for 
some time now, when it first appeared on 
popular products such as laptops it was seen as a 
gimmick and experienced difficulties with 
recognition. Users reported that they had set 
their fingerprint recognition yet when they 
attempted to unlock their system, it failed to 
recognise their fingerprint and other users 
experienced the opposite, in which they found 
other people could unlock their system. These 
systems have developed rapidly since this point 
and it is now a highly accurate authentication 
method as it is considered that no two 
fingerprints will ever be the same. Fingerprints 
are analysed based on certain patterns, there are 
three major patterns: loops (65%), whorls (30%) 
and arches (30%) (J.W. Osterburg et al. 1977).  
 
The ridge lines present in a fingerprint will not 
change from birth until death therefore we can 
be sure that everyone has a unique fingerprint 
however we must determine every characteristic 
in each fingerprint to pinpoint what makes it 
unique to that person. These characteristics are 
named Galton characteristics after Sir Francis 
Galton who studied the individual 
characteristics within fingerprints. There are ten 
types of ridge lines within fingerprints which 
help with the characterisation of a fingerprint 
and these characteristics are analysed using grid 
over the fingerprint to help break down each 
section. 
 
In a study (J.W. Osterburg et al. 1977) the 
probability of confirming an identity using a 
partial fingerprint is calculated, they display a 
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full table of probability values however do not 
conclude these findings in writing. They explain 
that naturally, there is a much lower chance of 
not being able to obtain a match in the database 
if only a partial print is given. Their research 
does not clearly state whether their results found 
the probability of confirming an identity to be 
less for a partial fingerprint in comparison to the 
full fingerprint although it is suggested 
throughout the paper. 
2.2 Iris Recognition 
Iris recognition is the latest biometric device to 
be implemented successfully into a full working 
environment, recently we have seen this 
technology added to airports as a passport 
control security feature. With the current level 
of security at such a high point throughout 
airports worldwide, it is fair to assume that a lot 
is resting on the shoulders of this particular 
system however you would expect that vast 
amounts of research have been done to conclude 
that this technology is suitable for this purpose. 
Similar to fingerprints, a human iris has a 
number of distinct features that make up a very 
complex pattern, these features include nerve 
rings, fibre thinning, pigment spots and other 
features (Rankin et al. 2011). Various factors 
need to be considered with iris scanning to 
ensure that an accurate image of the iris is 
extracted, as the human eye reacts accordingly 
to certain lighting then this could potentially 
affect the image that is extracted. 
 
Low lighting is recommended as when there is a 
strain upon the eye, this is when we will see the 
image change. There should also be a certain 
point that each person should look at so that the 
device can obtain a consistent reading from the 
same angle each time, this also ensures that the 
most accurate reading can be taken each time. In 
a recent study (Rankin et al. 2011) it was found 
that the iris texture could be graded effectively 
into a manner in which the iris could be 
identified from finest to coarsest ranging from 
grade one to six respectively. This research was 
done to investigate whether the iris recognition 
system would fail over time as natural effects 
take their toll on the human iris and alter the 
way in which such a system would interpret the 
iris. In their investigations, they sampled images 
from 119 adults by capturing images of their iris 
from both left and right eyes. The adults that 
were tested were between the ages of 19 and 65. 
Binary iris codes were generated from features 
that had been extracted from the original iris 
images and then the binary codes are compared 
to see if they match. This calculation was done 
by using “a quantified dissimilarity measure 
called the Hamming Distance (HD)” (Rankin et 
al. 2011). From the comparison of the Hamming 
Distance, you can tell whether the patterns 
belong to the same iris. They obtained results 
which showed an overall recognition failure rate 
of 21% after sampling at 3 and 6 months where 
failures rates were 21.2% and 20.5% 
respectively. They conclude that as they only 
measured their results over a relatively short 
period for such a test, they could only predict 
that over time, rates of recognition failure will 
increase and that rates would vary depending on 
the value of the Hamming Distance. They 
discuss that if the Hamming Distance is set too 
low then users would experience an increased 
rate in failures whereas if it was set too high 
then there would be an increased chance of false 
positive results. At present, the only method of 
preventing failure caused by changes to the iris 
is to re-enrol the image of the iris into the 
system upon any changes however this method 
leaves the system vulnerable to security attacks. 
2.3 Facial Recognition 
Facial recognition systems consist of a soft and 
hard biometric system, both serving very 
different purposes. A soft biometric system will 
analyse features that are not unique to simply 
one person, they will be straight forward 
features that could apply to hundreds of 
thousands of people. Soft biometrics would not 
be used in a situation in which the security of a 
system should be strict, if personal details could 
be at risk or where an identity can be imitated. 
The features that are interpreted in soft 
biometric systems would be gender, eye colour, 
hair colour, skin colour, height and weight (Gian 
Luca Marcialis et al. 2009). Obviously there is a 
good chance that several people throughout the 
world will share all of the listed characteristics 
and therefore the system would be unable to 
identify one specific person. This means that the 
chance of unauthorised access is already above 
0% which would be the target for any secure 
system. 
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Despite a serious lack of real security within soft 
biometrics in facial recognition, hard biometrics 
is right at the top of the current biometric 
security systems. As mentioned before with iris 
recognition systems being implemented within 
airports, facial recognition is also in place 
alongside previously mentioned systems. With 
security measures being so high, using multiple 
biometric systems together will ensure that the 
chance of a false acceptance or rejection is 
reduced wherever possible. Facial recognition 
systems look for unique characteristics just as 
all other systems, it will take measurements 
from vital points in a person's facial structure 
and compare it to measurements that it is 
currently reading from either a photograph or 
previous database entry. 
3 Analysis of Current Research on 
Biometric Authentication 
Methods 
A system must be found which is the most 
secure and efficient choice for online security, 
there will need to be a focus on what the 
probability of a mistake will be because in this 
day and age there is no room for error. A breach 
in security where IT systems are involved is 
considered a substantial failure because we have 
so much advanced technology available to us. 
 
All of the biometric technology seems to 
provide excellent solutions for online security, 
for example fingerprints are unique to one 
person and they require no specific environment 
in order for the scan to take place due to the 
person having to physically interact with the 
scanner. In a study (J.W Osterburg et al. 1977) 
they discuss that the weakest fingerprint reading 
must have consist of 12 ridge endings and a 
partial fingerprint has a probability of around 20 
(10
-20
) of having 12 ridge endings. Therefore the 
probability of a false rejection in increased as 
the system would have less chance of matching 
the fingerprint. However it is safe to say that if 
the fingerprint scanner is used correctly and full 
fingerprint in taken then the room for error is 
very low. 
 
Iris scanning is very similar in the way that a 
person's iris is unique to them and no one will 
ever have the same iris. Therefore it means that 
as long as the iris scan is interpreted by the 
system correctly then there will be no errors in 
identifying someone. In a recent study (Rankin 
et al. 2011) it is suggested that certain factors 
may affect the scanning of an iris such as the 
environment and how lighting can cause a strain 
on the human eye, causing the iris to dilate or 
contract to different angles and this would 
provide a different reading to other lighting 
levels. However the main, concern was not with 
getting the person into the correct environment, 
it was the concern that the human iris can be 
subject to change over time due to a number of 
factors.  
 
In their research they found that a major factor 
that can affect the iris is ageing as well as 
medication, disease and surgery. The texture of 
the iris can cause a false reading if it changes 
from a previous reading, this is due to a change 
in the fibre pattern formation of the iris which 
eventually causes a variety of failure rates. 
 
Facial scanning was either used as a soft or hard 
biometric system, however for the purpose of 
online security, it would appear that soft 
biometrics alone would not suffice. Soft 
biometrics may be useful to implement 
alongside another system as an extra measure of 
security, however with this system not being as 
advanced as others and you must expect that the 
system could be easily deceived. A hard 
biometric system could be used as a primary 
method of authentication for online security, due 
to its improved accuracy and interpretation of 
several key features of the human face.  
 
By measuring vital features of a person's face it 
is possible to use these measurements to narrow 
down an identity search however there may be 
more than one person with the same 
measurements, meaning that the reading would 
not be able to match to a unique record such as a 
finger print or iris. It would be a great 
improvement to any of the proposed soft 
biometric methods but there would still question 
marks over how unique each of the 
characteristics are. As with the soft biometrics it 
may be a system that would be best used with 
another system, there is another factor that needs 
to be considered which is if there are any 
physical changes since their last scan. Weight 
loss, surgery or disease could cause a change in 
measurements which would be used to 
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determine whether the image matched who was 
meant to be gaining access to the system. 
4 Conclusions 
Biometrics within online security is without 
doubt the next step forward for many reasons, 
not only is there several biometric systems that 
could be implemented but it is truly an 
authentication method that is unique to one 
person. After analysing all of the systems in this 
paper, it is clear to see that still we can 
encounter problems with a system that would 
seem to be highly secure. Passwords are the 
current leading security method, almost every 
website has the option register and for this a 
password is required. This means that either 
people use the same password for everything 
which could lead to multiple accounts being 
compromised if that one password is revealed 
however having a separate password for each 
website could cause users to forget passwords. 
Passwords are easily compromised as they can 
be entered by anyone, obviously they need to 
obtain password first but there are methods of 
exploiting passwords so there is definitely a call 
for a new method of authentication. 
 
Fingerprint recognition is a system that has 
already been implemented throughout many 
systems however reports suggest that false 
positives and negatives can occur with the 
system. The problem is however not with the 
system that reads the fingerprint as current 
research shows that it is highly accurate and 
comparison with database records is accurate 
and secure. The main problem seems to be with 
obtaining a full fingerprint scan when using the 
system, as research has shown, the probability of 
receiving a false reading is higher. This is a 
problem that could have a simple solution, if 
there was a method of securing the finger on the 
reader ensuring a full reading every time. If this 
could be done then there is no doubt that 
fingerprint recognition could be the leading 
biometric system for online security, we know 
that everyone has unique fingerprint pattern that 
will not change throughout their lifetime and 
therefore you can guarantee that whoever is 
authenticating, is actually the correct person. 
 
Current research highlights what could be 
considered as major flaw in iris recognition 
systems in the way that the human iris changes 
throughout a person‟s lifetime and can be 
directly affected by other factors over time. It 
was found that the texture of the iris can change 
naturally as well as with the effects of 
medication therefore the system would fail to 
match the iris pattern with an image stored on a 
database. As mentioned, re-enrolling the iris into 
the database would currently be the only way in 
which the system would once again recognise 
that image and obviously re-enrolling regularly 
could present security issues as you would 
prefer not having to ever re-enrol an image. It is 
mentioned in the current research (Rankin et al. 
2011) that if a more intelligent system which 
could deal with any physiological changes to the 
iris then it would be more accurate and would 
have less chance of being used for fraud. This 
statement is not suggesting that such system is 
currently being developed and from other 
research it appears that there are no current 
advances with this problem. 
 
Facial Recognition was discussed as there are 
hard and soft biometric systems with this 
specific method, both of these are suitable for 
online security however both for different 
situations. Soft biometric systems are not 
reliable enough to be used as a primary 
authentication method especially where sensitive 
information could be in question. Soft 
biometrics could be used as an extra layer of 
security alongside another method such as 
passwords, if a user enters the correct password 
then the system will then check if the user has 
blonde hair, blue eyes and white skin for 
example. Hard biometrics could be used as a 
primary method of confirming an identity by 
confirming vital statistics of a user which would 
be unique to them. Obviously it is a possibility 
that someone else could share these features 
however it is highly unlikely that someone 
would share multiple and therefore you would 
have a unique profile.  
 
To conclude, the biometrics systems available 
for use with online security all have problems, 
some more than others. More than anything, the 
situation must be considered and with online 
security we have to be thinking that this system 
can be used in a variety of situations ranging 
from professional to home use. Fingerprint 
recognition systems have a minor problem in 
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which a full fingerprint is not always obtained 
by the reader, this is a human error by not 
placing their finger correctly onto the reader 
however in comparison to iris recognition 
systems which are proved to fail over time. The 
other major problem with facial and iris 
technology is that in order to capture the quality 
of image needed to process iris and facial 
recognition you would need a good quality 
system in place with the correct conditions. In 
terms of home use, this would not be a viable 
option in the majority of cases. Therefore 
fingerprint recognition is the best suited system 
for online security across all of the possible 
situations as well as proving to have the least 
problems with accuracy. 
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An Evaluation of Current Intrusion Detection Systems Research 
 
Gavin Alexander Burns 
 
Abstract 
This paper is looking at a number of new research journals on the subject of 
Intrusion Detection Systems. This is a system that at present monitors for known 
attacks on the system, but current research is looking into ways to update the 
system to allow it to find unknown attacks as well.  A number of papers, dating 
from 2006 to the newest 2011, on the subject were found some of which have 
been looked at in more detail within this paper.  The information examined 
explored testing on a university‟s network, testing datasets, and re-examining 
past research information to underline comparisons with other systems that 
appear to do what they set out to do.  The Intrusion Detection System found 
anomalies on the university network. One of the research papers showed that no 
testing had been done.   What was found is that there is a lot of diverse research 
on this technology some really well carried out, but none that on their own will 
solve the problem. What did come to light was that more research and testing 
will be needed to have a truly standalone system but progress is being made.  
 
1 Introduction 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be 
classed as another level of protection which can 
sit behind the firewall as a secondary form of 
protection. They are software applications that 
monitor the network looking for malicious 
activities and also policy violations and can also 
produce a log and report for the network 
administrators. There are various forms of 
research going on at present. There is the 
construction of lightweight IDS which will 
detect anomalies in networks (Siva et al. 2011). 
There is also research into Swarm Intelligence 
which is a new bio inspired method that has 
taken its inspiration from the way swarms of 
bees and other insects work (Kolias, et al. 
(2011). There is also (Fang-Yie Leu. et al. 
2009) who are doing research into enhancing 
their previous grid-based intrusion detection 
system. Then there is the research by (Xenakis, 
Panos et al. 2010) who are looking into the 
evaluation of intrusion detection architectures 
for the mobile ad hoc networks. For this paper 
we will look at a number of different research 
journals and try to analyse their findings 
 
2 ULISSE Anomaly detection with 
intelligence 
 Unsupervised Learning IDS with 2Stage Engine 
(ULISSE) is the start point which according to 
Zanero (2008) “It uses two tier architecture with 
unsupervised learning algorithms to perform 
network intrusion and anomaly detection. 
ULISSE uses a combination of clustering of 
packet payloads and correlation of anomalies in 
the packet stream.” (Zanero, 2008) 
This method has come about because of our use 
of complex networked computer systems in our 
everyday life. This dependence has brought 
about the need to make the networks we use 
more secure which is where it gets more 
complex. He also states that “The majority of 
network IDS systems deployed today are 
misuse-based” (Zanero, 2008) which in effect 
the IDS systems just sit and wait till a known 
signature of an intrusion type happens. 
Unfortunately this makes them ineffective 
against new attacks and a great number of 
evasion techniques. Which means these systems 
can give a lot of false negative and possibly 
false positives.  
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However using this misuse-based system on 
critical networks where the numbers of threats 
are increasing is not the best solution anymore 
which is why ULISSE has been developed. 
ULISSE is a Two Tier network based anomaly 
IDS system designed to analyze the network 
packets and avoid discarding its contents with 
the use of the two tiers first by reducing the 
packets payload to a more tractable size, then 
with a traditional anomaly algorithm. (Zanero, 
2008) 
 
Similar approaches are being used by Tajbakhsh 
et al. (2009) who were looking into using fuzzy 
association rules for their method of intrusion 
detection, and Kamran  et al. (2009) who were 
looking into an adaptive genetic based learning 
system for detection systems. Both of their 
methods were using a two tier system. 
2.1 Why is it different? 
At present there is a need to look at the packet 
flow in order to undertake packet level network 
intelligence. The packet header data is dealt 
with easily as it is a uniform size and can be 
mapped to a time series, but problems occur 
when dealing with the payload data of the 
packet as they are of varying size.  
 
This problem is over come by most of the 
existing research using unsupervised learning 
algorithms for the purpose of intrusion detection 
by dropping the payload data and only using the 
packet header information. This leads to the 
development of ULISSE as dropping the 
payload data looses information that is needed 
to detect most attacks as they are only detectable 
by analyzing this payload data. 
 
ULISSE is proposed as a two tier architecture 
solution that applies a clustering algorithm to 
the payload data which allocates a single value 
to them which is then added to information from 
the header then passed on to the second tier 
which is an anomaly detection algorithm. 
(Zanero, 2008) 
2.2 Testing 
According to Zanero (2008) the tests seem to 
have been carried out in a well organised and 
controlled way. To evaluate ULISSE in a 
repeatable manner it was ran over various days 
of traffic taken from the 1999 DARPA dataset 
as well as adding attacks against the Apache 
web server and Samba service using Metasploit. 
The results compare well and indeed outperform 
the results given for SmartSifter and PAYL 
which are two other prototype intrusion 
detection systems which used the KDD Cup 
1999 dataset which is derived from the 1999 
DARPA dataset for their testing. 
2.3 Conclusion 
Although the tests seem to be a success the 
noticeable problem is that they are not a direct 
comparison tests as the same testing dataset has 
not been used even though it is stated that KDD 
Cup 1999 dataset is taken from the 1999 
DARPA dataset that was used. Also it would be 
useful to investigate if there are any newer 
evaluation tests available which could give a 
more up to date image of current network 
traffic, although this does give the opportunity 
for the team or a new team to continue the 
research in the future.  
 
3 HawkEye Solutions A Network 
Intrusion Detection System 
Abstract 
HawkEye Solutions is the name given to the 
development group‟s network intrusion detec-
tion system. It is a basic system that detects ab-
normal internet protocol (IP) packets which they 
say is “the basic building blocks of an IDS that 
include mechanisms for carrying out TCP port 
scans, Traceroute scan, which in association 
with the ping scan can monitor network health.” 
(Mukhopadhyay et al 2011)   
 
What it is described as is a libpcap-based packet 
sniffer and logger which are made up of three 
primary subsystems which are packet decoder, 
detection engine, and logging and alerting. 
Some of its features are rule based logging 
which allows it to detect a number of different 
types of attacks. It also includes real time 
alerting with the alerts sent to syslog, popup 
messages, or an alert file, and its configuration 
is done though command line switches. 
(Mukhopadhyay et al 2011)   
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3.1 How it works 
The system is similar in looks to its peers but 
has a greater focus on the security of packet 
sniffing with its most important features being 
packet payload inspection. This is where the 
application layer of the packet is decoded and 
rules can be given to collect specific data within 
the traffic which allows the system to detect 
many different types of unwanted activity. The 
other big advantage is that the output data is of a 
more user focused format. Hawkeye Solutions is 
also set to a working principle which is an 
eleven step by step guide on how the system is 
coded to work from the beginning of the event 
to the eventual conclusion (Mukhopadhyay et al. 
2011) 
3.2 Testing and Conclusion 
There has been no definitive repeatable testing 
using a recognised dataset all that seems to have 
been done is they have set Hawkeye off on 
different types of scans then explained the 
outcome within the text of the paper. Also there 
is what they claim to be a comparison of what 
type of features Hawkeye has and can do 
compared  against a number of other basic IDS 
systems and the results that they give come out 
in favour of the Hawkeye system. So with the 
evidence that is presented with in this paper it is 
quite evident that a lot more testing is needed 
before the Hawkeye Solutions system can be 
said to work. 
 
4 Hybrid honeypot framework to 
improve intrusion detection 
To some a honeypot is intended as a way to 
make attackers believe they are somewhere 
within your system when in reality they are in a 
controlled part of the system, but to others it is a 
form of technology for the detection of attacks 
or in some instances real computer systems that 
are designed to be hacked into so as to gain 
information from about the hacker and how to 
stop them in the future. Honeypots get classed 
into two wide categories production and 
research. Production honeypots are there to 
reduce an organizations risk by keeping them 
away from real system. Research honeypots are 
used for information collection. Honeypots are 
also classified by the level of interaction they 
allow with the attacker the more interaction 
there is the more information can be collected. 
Low interaction which most are virtual 
operating systems and services these are 
relatively simple to deploy but are easy to 
detect, and high interaction which are a 
development of real systems. The outline for the 
work undertaken in this journal is to use low 
interaction honeypots that emulate operating 
systems or services and pass malicious traffic on 
to high interaction honeypots to analyze an 
intruder‟s activity then results can be used to 
take measures to protect the network. They are 
using the honeypot technology to try to get 
around the inherent problems of the traditional 
intrusion detection systems. As honeypots can 
be used to lure hackers into a controlled 
environment to protect the real system resources 
and use the time to analyze their activities and 
how defend against it.  (Artail et al 2006) 
4.1 Proposed hybrid honeypot 
Artail et al (2006) suggest proposing an 
intrusion detection system with an adaptable low 
interaction honeypot that can adjust to the 
changes in the network. They will be deployed 
though unused IP addresses on the network to 
help them blend in and look like the real 
operating systems and services around them. In 
most instances the traffic that is directed to the 
low interaction honeypots will be passed on 
seamlessly to high interaction honeypots. This 
combination has the advantage of requiring a 
minimum of administrative intervention as the 
number of honeypots adjusts automatically 
around the state of the network and available IP 
addresses. It also magnifies the high interaction 
honeypots with the redirection of the traffic 
from the low interaction honeypots which also 
helps make the low interaction honeypots look 
like real systems to anyone trying to hack the 
system. 
 
The system will need to use static IP addresses 
and a relatively large number of free IP 
addresses are required as the more available free 
IP addresses the higher chance there will be to 
detect any intruders. 
4.2 Testing and Results 
The test of the hybrid system was carried out by 
integrating it into the network of the Faculty of 
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Engineering and Architecture at the American 
University of Beirut which had at least four 
hundred computers. Their initial scan of the 
network indicated that a significant number of 
the honeypot virtual systems could be used. 
They performed two sets of tests effecting 75 
computers to get an understanding of the impact 
the scans can have on the network and the length 
of time they take.  
 
The first test was an Nmap load test to measure 
the data collection performance of the system 
and what sort of effect it has on the network. 
The second set of tests, nesses tests, which is an 
open source vulnerability tester which subjects 
the system to simulated attacks as well as 
verifying the performance. 
 
The tests lasted for over two weeks and came up 
with some interesting results; it detected a 
hacking activity through the logs generated by 
the low interaction honeypots. The hacker used 
an IP address of a computer that was known to 
not be used implying that the address was 
spoofed. The low interaction honeypot logs 
came up with a possible attack by showing that 
unused IPs were being scanned by a hacker 
using nmap, and the system helped detect the 
presence of the Natche virus on one of the 
machines. (Artail et al, 2006) 
4.3 Conclusion 
This research seems to be well thought out and 
set up their testing looks to be of a very high 
standard and although their main test will not be 
repeatable as no know standard testing dataset 
or systems were used, they have carried 
everything out on a real University system and it 
did come up with some good results. They are 
also aware that the system needs more time 
spent on it to develop it more and as such it 
cannot be discredited totally. 
5 Conclusions 
Currently there is no Intrusion Detection System 
that can fully protect network systems from 
unknown attacks which means that at present it 
is a make do system as the system has to be kept 
up to date with the known attack signatures to 
make sure the system is protected in the most 
efficient way. Unfortunately that means the 
network administrator may have to update the 
system on a daily basis, and that still will not be 
enough if an unknown attack signature happens 
as this will just get straight through without 
causing any alarm or log entry. 
 
The research which has been looked at is very 
interesting in that it is looking at different ways 
to allow the network intrusion systems that are 
being developed and adapted to catch the 
unknown attacks and intrusions that can occur 
before they have appeared on any update 
database or software update as for them to 
appear on those someone has to detect them in 
the first place. 
 
Generally the current research looked at was of 
a good standard, but unfortunately some as in 
the case of HawkEye Solutions has not got 
enough depth to it as they have done no known 
repeatable testing. On a positive outlook for 
HawkEye Solutions if extra research and 
development can be done and achieve the results 
which is hoped then it will be a much needed 
improvement over some of the systems that it 
was compared against. 
 
With the research done into the ULISSE 
network detection system it looks very 
promising as their way of looking into the 
packets contents and not just discarding it can 
be looked at as a great improvement as it means 
there will not be as many dropped packets which 
can be used to detect any attacks earlier. Also 
what is promising is the two tier system that has 
an anomaly detection algorithm which will help 
with any new attacks that happen. The testing 
that was done was of a good standard with good 
recorded out comes. 
 
The research carried out on the honeypot 
framework was also very interesting as this 
method will help to protect the systems very 
well as the attacks can be controlled as they are 
not on the actual system. The testing for the 
honeypots was of a high standard as they were 
done on an actual real world system and not just 
a test bed. If their results can be replicated 
elsewhere on other systems it will prove very 
promising. 
 
One thing stands out with all this research is 
there is still a need for more research to solve 
problems within some of the research or to 
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improve it even more. One possible way to go 
could be to add different research together to 
see if two or more methods could get to the 
solution that is being looked for. A possible 
solution that has came about with this paper is 
the possible outcome of merging  ULISSE 
system with the honeypot framework as it looks 
like they could be beneficial together as the 
honeypot could give ULISSE extra time to catch 
new attacks.   
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An Analysis of Current Research on Quantum Key Distribution 
 
Mark Lorraine 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper is an analysis of current Quantum Key Distribution research, asking 
whether the protocol has a place in the future of security.  
 
 
 
  
1 Introduction 
1.1 The Problem with Quantum Key 
Distribution 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is one of the 
few aspects of quantum computing to be not 
only physically realised, but ultimately 
commercially available.  Magiq Technologies, 
founded in 1999, sells quantum hardware from 
www.magiqtech.com claiming that their 
commercial versions of QKD are 
unconditionally secure, as of this paper being 
written. For some time, QKD had been regarded 
as being impenetrable.  However, recent studies 
have shown that QKD has flaws as a security 
system. 
 
This paper will be looking at the more recent 
papers on QKD and discussing how secure 
QKD really is and if it has a long term place on 
the market. 
1.2 What is Quantum Computing? 
A quantum computer is a device which meets 
most, if not all, of the following criteria: 
 
Be a scalable physical system with well-defined 
qubits  
Be initializable to a simple fiducial state such as 
|000...>  
Have much longer decoherence times  
Have a universal set of quantum gates  
Permit high quantum efficiency, qubit-specific 
measurements  
(DiVincenzo, 2000) 
 
A qubit is any item to which quantum physics 
applies which can have at least two different 
states.  Usually, these are particles which are 
spun either on the x or y axis to emulate 1s and 
0s which are used in classical computing.  
1.3 What is QKD? 
QKD is a security protocol which combines the 
classical idea of key distribution and one-time 
pads with elements of quantum mechanics which 
are supposed to lend themselves to complete 
security. 
 
Currently, QKD is being used very sparingly, 
but there is a major QKD network used for the 
most important governmental and financial data 
transfers, which require the utmost security. 
This is a massive responsibility for QKD and if 
the total security of QKD starts to falter and 
turns out to be a facade, then it is only a matter 
of time before it falls out of favour, or worse 
still, is exploited.  
2 An Analysis of QKD 
2.1 A Brief Introduction to QKD  
QKD is widely accepted to be unconditionally 
secure (Lo et al, 1999). 
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There are several QKD protocols, but the oldest 
and most developed is BB84, named after the 
two creators, Charles H. Bennett and Gilles 
Brassard and the year of its creation. 
 
In the networking scenario displayed in Fig 1., 
using photon polarisation, Alice chooses a 
random string of bits to send to Bob and then 
randomly selects one of two basis supported by 
the protocol.  The rectilinear basis has 
horizontal and vertical photons representing 0 
and 1 respectively.  Similarly, the diagonal   
basis has 45-degree and 135-degree photons 
representing 0 and 1 respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1.  This shows a BB84 QKD network 
between two users, Alice and Bob, and Eve, 
who is an eavesdropper on the quantum 
channel.  The quantum channel only 
transmits data in one direction, from Alice to 
Bob (Rieffel and Polak, 2000, p.307) 
 
Once Alice has chosen a string and basis, the 
photon qubits are sent to Bob, via a one way 
quantum channel.  Once Bob receives the 
qubits, he randomly, and independently of Alice 
decides to measure each qubit using a rectilinear 
or diagonal basis and interprets this back into 
binary.  Attempting to read a rectilinear qubit 
using a diagonal basis will produce a random 
answer and all information is lost.  Therefore, 
what Bob ends up with is meaningful data from 
the qubits he correctly guessed the basis for, 
which is on average, 50%. 
   
After that, the remaining steps occur on the 
public channel.  Bob and Alice determine which 
of the qubits were received successfully and 
correctly measured.  Once the binary results 
have been verified by Alice, this becomes a key 
and is transmitted in small sections to make the 
results of potential interception negligible. A 
table of these steps is shown in Fig 2. 
 
  
Figure 2.  This table shows what actions are 
performed by Alice and Bob in the creation 
of the shared secret key.  Note that, once the 
key has been generated, there is no further 
informtion on the quantum channel until all 
of the key has been used. (Bennett and 
Brassard, 1984, p.177) 
 
If Eve tries to listen in on the quantum channel, 
because of the fact that you can‟t copy a 
quantum state, the mixed basis make it difficult 
to try to replicate the data reliably and send on 
to Bob without a high error rate (Bennett and 
Brassard, 1984 pp.175-178). 
2.2 Discussing the Security of QKD 
Bennett and Brassard‟s paper on QKD aimed to 
delve into the world of quantum mechanics to 
design a cryptographic system, creating a system 
on which it is theoretically impossible to 
eavesdrop.  They decided to attempt to exploit 
the uncertainty principle in doing this.  They 
proposed that current digital cryptography was 
flawed, as it cannot generate truly random 
numbers and that using quantum mechanics 
would also be a key advantage in this context.     
 
Their idea was most certainly a very valid claim.  
This is the sort of thing that can have world-
wide implications in the security industry.  A 
definite break-through, built on the shoulders of 
previous research into making money which, in 
principle, cannot be counterfeited (Wiesner, 
1981) and unforgeable subway tokens (Bennett 
et al, 1983).  Both of these used quantum coding 
as a security measure.  Cryptography is one of 
the many aspects of computing which is in a 
constant game of catch-up, with every new 
cryptographic method slowly sliding towards 
becoming obsolete.  Hackers will always find a 
way around conventional classical security, 
because no computer generated number is ever 
truly random and it is only ever a matter of time 
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before the formula for generating it is 
calculated.  Therefore, any progress towards a 
cryptographic method which would be 
impenetrable is an excellent idea.  They do 
concede, however, that implementation of 
particles for data transfer is limited in practice 
because of how weak the signal has to be 
without any way to strengthen the signal. 
 
Bennett and Brassard theorised that polarised 
light would be the form for their qubit to take.  
They reached this conclusion, because ordinary 
light is easily polarised by a filter, and the axis 
of the polarisation is determined by the 
orientation of the filter.  Additionally, picking 
out a single polarised photon is also possible, 
simply by picking them from a polarised beam.  
They reason that while polarisation of a photon 
is a continuous variable, the uncertainty 
principle prevents more than one bit of data 
being obtained.  Furthermore, polarised axes 
which are the same as the filter will always 
result in transmission and polarised axes which 
are perpendicular will definitely be absorbed.  
Any other value will randomly be transmitted or 
not.  It is not possible to further measure axes, 
because after being transmitted, they will always 
have the same polarisation as the filter and 
because it is impossible to clone a quantum state 
reliably. 
 
The beginnings of this element of their 
reasoning are logically sound. They put forward 
polarised light as their data transfer method and 
justify it well, highlighting the properties which 
make it well suited to the task.  However, they 
do not compare using photons with using any of 
the other various particles which could 
potentially be put in their place. 
 
Bennett and Brassard next moved onto the 
problem of cryptography.  They proposed the 
idea of using a secure quantum channel to 
address the problem of secretly transferring a 
number for use in a one-time pad, or any other 
security application which require shared secret 
knowledge.  They suggest that two users, Alice 
and Bob, should be connected by a quantum and 
a classical channel.  A secret number can be 
generated over the quantum channel in such a 
way that there is a high probability that an 
eavesdropper (Eve) has disturbed the 
transmission.  If the transmission is secure, then 
the shared secret is then used in whichever 
format is desired on the classical channel.  If the 
transmission is not secure, then the outcome is 
discarded and the process repeated. 
   
This is an excellent proposition for how to 
implement the secure quantum channel.  The 
one-time pad is the most secure cryptographic 
method, but its big weakness is sharing a secret 
number before the encryption can begin.  The 
combination of this cryptographic method with a 
quantum channel is therefore, theoretically 
completely secure.  Additionally, the application 
of the convention of named users from 
cryptography, Alice, Bob and Eve, make the 
whole thing easier to follow. 
 
Bennett and Brassard follow up their summary 
of how the quantum channel can be 
implemented alongside a classical one by going 
into more detail.  They provide a detailed, step 
by step walkthrough of how Alice and Bob 
communicate over the quantum and classical 
channel to produce a shared secret key.  (I again 
refer you Fig 2. which summaries this 
excellently.) They say that if an eavesdropper 
doesn‟t know the secret key after it has been 
generated, that they would have a minimal 
chance of being able to do any meaningful 
interception on the classical channel.  An 
eavesdropper can prevent communication by 
suppressing either the classical or quantum 
channel, but this will not fool Alice or Bob into 
thinking the network is safe. 
 
The protocols inner workings are obviously well 
reasoned out and do indeed create an 
unconditionally secure system.  Also, the paper 
makes good use of tables to clarify and 
summarise the facts.  The paper has no 
conclusion, only results of the logical reasoning.  
Reflecting on it from a current perspective, it 
reasonable to conclude that with the BB84 
protocol having been conceived in theory, 
would have potential for error when practically 
implemented.    It is logical that something 
created only as a concept should come across 
certain issues when it is first built.  While minor 
improvements can be made to an idea before it 
is put into practice, it is only when it is truly 
tested by application of the idea that it can start 
to have its problems properly highlighted and 
addressed. As this is theoretical, the research 
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falls under the category of basic and the use of 
hard numbers means it is also quantitative.  
 
It has been proven that it is possible to exploit 
the fact that a single-photon detector‟s pause 
after a detection event leave‟s it vulnerable to an 
attack without leaving any noticeable difference 
in the error rate (Weier et al, 2011).   This 
research is valid, as QKD is used on a lot of 
high-security networks and any attacks on these 
networks should be addressed as soon as 
possible. 
 
The paper claims that, using a standard BB84 
protocol setup network, the single photon 
avalanche detector (SPAD) can be forced into 
dead time and effectively blinded, by well timed 
pulses sent by an eavesdropper. 
 
This is an important idea being explored.  If 
QKD is proven to have vulnerabilities, then it is 
important that they are addressed as quickly as 
possible if it is to have any long term presence 
as a high security product.  It wouldn‟t take 
much to make people think twice about how 
many more weaknesses haven‟t been noticed yet 
after the first questions are raised about the no 
longer unconditional security QKD provides. 
 
The paper goes on to discuss an experiment in 
which they used standard hardware found in 
almost all QKD networks and they also setup 
the pulse timing to a proper length for unbiased 
detections. They then proceed to use blinding 
pulses to blind the SPAD and while the SPAD is 
blinded, Eve can detect these instead without 
being noticed.  After an attack, Eve then uses 
what she has learned about the secret key to 
decode information sent on the classical 
channel.  The results are based on how well Eve 
can read the contents of the classical channel. 
After this, the experiment is repeated with 
increasing intensities of the blinding pulse and 
the results are compared. 
 
This is a very fair and unbiased experimental 
method.  It is also effective in getting to the nub 
of the issue, by actually having Eve listen in on 
the classical channel afterwards.  If the 
experiment was limited to how much of the 
shared secret key Eve could discover, the results 
would be much more limited.  It seems likely 
that each element was tested several times and 
that an average of the results was taken, but this 
is not specifically mentioned. 
 
The outcome of the experiment shows that at the 
lowest pulse intensity, the classical channel‟s 
data was barely discernible from being random, 
but the best result demonstrated that 98.83% of 
the classical data could be correctly discerned 
(see impossible to eavesdrop.  They decided to 
attempt to exploit the uncertainty principle in 
doing this.  They proposed that current digital 
cryptography was flawed, as it cannot generate 
truly random numbers and that using quantum 
mechanics would also be a key advantage in this 
context.     
 
Their idea was most certainly a very valid claim.  
This is the sort of thing that can have world-
wide implications in the security industry.  A 
definite break-through, built on the shoulders of 
previous research into making money which, in 
principle, cannot be counterfeited (Wiesner, 
1981) and unforgeable subway tokens (Bennett 
et al, 1983).  Both of these used quantum coding 
as a security measure.  Cryptography is one of 
the many aspects of computing which is in a 
constant game of catch-up, with every new 
cryptographic method slowly sliding towards 
becoming obsolete.  Hackers will always find a 
way around conventional classical security, 
because no computer generated number is ever 
truly random and it is only ever a matter of time 
before the formula for generating it is 
calculated.  Therefore, any progress towards a 
cryptographic method which would be 
impenetrable is an excellent idea.  They do 
concede, however, that implementation of 
particles for data transfer is limited in practice 
because of how weak the signal has to be 
without any way to strengthen the signal. 
 
Bennett and Brassard theorised that polarised 
light would be the form for their qubit to take.  
They reached this conclusion, because ordinary 
light is easily polarised by a filter, and the axis 
of the polarisation is determined by the 
orientation of the filter.  Additionally, picking 
out a single polarised photon is also possible, 
simply by picking them from a polarised beam.  
They reason that while polarisation of a photon 
is a continuous variable, the uncertainty 
principle prevents more than one bit of data 
being obtained.  Furthermore, polarised axes 
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which are the same as the filter will always 
result in transmission and polarised axes which 
are perpendicular will definitely be absorbed.  
Any other value will randomly be transmitted or 
not.  It is not possible to further measure axes, 
because after being transmitted, they will always 
have the same polarisation as the filter and 
because it is impossible to clone a quantum state 
reliably. 
 
The beginnings of this element of their 
reasoning are logically sound. They put forward 
polarised light as their data transfer method and 
justify it well, highlighting the properties which 
make it well suited to the task.  However, they 
do not compare using photons with using any of 
the other various particles which could 
potentially be put in their place. 
 
Bennett and Brassard next moved onto the 
problem of cryptography.  They proposed the 
idea of using a secure quantum channel to 
address the problem of secretly transferring a 
number for use in a one-time pad, or any other 
security application which require shared secret 
knowledge.  They suggest that two users, Alice 
and Bob, should be connected by a quantum and 
a classical channel.  A secret number can be 
generated over the quantum channel in such a 
way that there is a high probability that an 
eavesdropper (Eve) has disturbed the 
transmission.  If the transmission is secure, then 
the shared secret is then used in whichever 
format is desired on the classical channel.  If the 
transmission is not secure, then the outcome is 
discarded and the process repeated. 
   
This is an excellent proposition for how to 
implement the secure quantum channel.  The 
one-time pad is the most secure cryptographic 
method, but its big weakness is sharing a secret 
number before the encryption can begin.  The 
combination of this cryptographic method with a 
quantum channel is therefore, theoretically 
completely secure.  Additionally, the application 
of the convention of named users from 
cryptography, Alice, Bob and Eve, make the 
whole thing easier to follow. 
   
Bennett and Brassard follow up their summary 
of how the quantum channel can be 
implemented alongside a classical one by going 
into more detail.  They provide a detailed, step 
by step walkthrough of how Alice and Bob 
communicate over the quantum and classical 
channel to produce a shared secret key.  (I again 
refer you Fig 2. which summaries this 
excellently.) They say that if an eavesdropper 
doesn‟t know the secret key after it has been 
generated, that they would have a minimal 
chance of being able to do any meaningful 
interception on the classical channel.  An 
eavesdropper can prevent communication by 
suppressing either the classical or quantum 
channel, but this will not fool Alice or Bob into 
thinking the network is safe. 
 
The protocols inner workings are obviously well 
reasoned out and do indeed create an 
unconditionally secure system.  Also, the paper 
makes good use of tables to clarify and 
summarise the facts.  The paper has no 
conclusion, only results of the logical reasoning.  
Reflecting on it from a current perspective, it 
reasonable to conclude that with the BB84 
protocol having been conceived in theory, 
would have potential for error when practically 
implemented.    It is logical that something 
created only as a concept should come across 
certain issues when it is first built.  While minor 
improvements can be made to an idea before it 
is put into practice, it is only when it is truly 
tested by application of the idea that it can start 
to have its problems properly highlighted and 
addressed. As this is theoretical, the research 
falls under the category of basic and the use of 
hard numbers means it is also quantitative.  
 
It has been proven that it is possible to exploit 
the fact that a single-photon detector‟s pause 
after a detection event leave‟s it vulnerable to an 
attack without leaving any noticeable difference 
in the error rate (Weier et al, 2011).   This 
research is valid, as QKD is used on a lot of 
high-security networks and any attacks on these 
networks should be addressed as soon as 
possible. 
 
The paper claims that, using a standard BB84 
protocol setup network, the single photon 
avalanche detector (SPAD) can be forced into 
dead time and effectively blinded, by well timed 
pulses sent by an eavesdropper. 
 
This is an important idea being explored.  If 
QKD is proven to have vulnerabilities, then it is 
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important that they are addressed as quickly as 
possible if it is to have any long term presence 
as a high security product.  It wouldn‟t take 
much to make people think twice about how 
many more weaknesses haven‟t been noticed yet 
after the first questions are raised about the no 
longer unconditional security QKD provides. 
 
The paper goes on to discuss an experiment in 
which they used standard hardware found in 
almost all QKD networks and they also setup 
the pulse timing to a proper length for unbiased 
detections. They then proceed to use blinding 
pulses to blind the SPAD and while the SPAD is 
blinded, Eve can detect these instead without 
being noticed.  After an attack, Eve then uses 
what she has learned about the secret key to 
decode information sent on the classical 
channel.  The results are based on how well Eve 
can read the contents of the classical channel. 
After this, the experiment is repeated with 
increasing intensities of the blinding pulse and 
the results are compared. 
 
This is a very fair and unbiased experimental 
method.  It is also effective in getting to the nub 
of the issue, by actually having Eve listen in on 
the classical channel afterwards.  If the 
experiment was limited to how much of the 
shared secret key Eve could discover, the results 
would be much more limited.  It seems likely 
that each element was tested several times and 
that an average of the results was taken, but this 
is not specifically mentioned. 
 
The outcome of the experiment shows that at the 
lowest pulse intensity, the classical channel‟s 
data was barely discernable from being random, 
but the best result demonstrated that 98.83% of 
the classical data could be correctly discerned 
(seeimpossible to eavesdrop.  They decided to 
attempt to exploit the uncertainty principle in 
doing this.  They proposed that current digital 
cryptography was flawed, as it cannot generate 
truly random numbers and that using quantum 
mechanics would also be a key advantage in this 
context.     
 
Their idea was most certainly a very valid claim.  
This is the sort of thing that can have world-
wide implications in the security industry.  A 
definite break-through, built on the shoulders of 
previous research into making money which, in 
principle, cannot be counterfeited (Wiesner, 
1981) and unforgeable subway tokens (Bennett 
et al, 1983).  Both of these used quantum coding 
as a security measure.  Cryptography is one of 
the many aspects of computing which is in a 
constant game of catch-up, with every new 
cryptographic method slowly sliding towards 
becoming obsolete.  Hackers will always find a 
way around conventional classical security, 
because no computer generated number is ever 
truly random and it is only ever a matter of time 
before the formula for generating it is 
calculated.  Therefore, any progress towards a 
cryptographic method which would be 
impenetrable is an excellent idea.  They do 
concede, however, that implementation of 
particles for data transfer is limited in practice 
because of how weak the signal has to be 
without any way to strengthen the signal. 
 
Bennett and Brassard theorised that polarised 
light would be the form for their qubit to take.  
They reached this conclusion, because ordinary 
light is easily polarised by a filter, and the axis 
of the polarisation is determined by the 
orientation of the filter.  Additionally, picking 
out a single polarised photon is also possible, 
simply by picking them from a polarised beam.  
They reason that while polarisation of a photon 
is a continuous variable, the uncertainty 
principle prevents more than one bit of data 
being obtained.  Furthermore, polarised axes 
which are the same as the filter will always 
result in transmission and polarised axes which 
are perpendicular will definitely be absorbed.  
Any other value will randomly be transmitted or 
not.  It is not possible to further measure axes, 
because after being transmitted, they will always 
have the same polarisation as the filter and 
because it is impossible to clone a quantum state 
reliably. 
 
The beginnings of this element of their 
reasoning are logically sound. They put forward 
polarised light as their data transfer method and 
justify it well, highlighting the properties which 
make it well suited to the task.  However, they 
do not compare using photons with using any of 
the other various particles which could 
potentially be put in their place. 
 
Bennett and Brassard next moved onto the 
problem of cryptography.  They proposed the 
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idea of using a secure quantum channel to 
address the problem of secretly transferring a 
number for use in a one-time pad, or any other 
security application which require shared secret 
knowledge.  They suggest that two users, Alice 
and Bob, should be connected by a quantum and 
a classical channel.  A secret number can be 
generated over the quantum channel in such a 
way that there is a high probability that an 
eavesdropper (Eve) has disturbed the 
transmission.  If the transmission is secure, then 
the shared secret is then used in whichever 
format is desired on the classical channel.  If the 
transmission is not secure, then the outcome is 
discarded and the process repeated. 
   
This is an excellent proposition for how to 
implement the secure quantum channel.  The 
one-time pad is the most secure cryptographic 
method, but its big weakness is sharing a secret 
number before the encryption can begin.  The 
combination of this cryptographic method with a 
quantum channel is therefore, theoretically 
completely secure.  Additionally, the application 
of the convention of named users from 
cryptography, Alice, Bob and Eve, make the 
whole thing easier to follow. 
   
Bennett and Brassard follow up their summary 
of how the quantum channel can be 
implemented alongside a classical one by going 
into more detail.  They provide a detailed, step 
by step walkthrough of how Alice and Bob 
communicate over the quantum and classical 
channel to produce a shared secret key.  (I again 
refer you Fig 2. which summaries this 
excellently.) They say that if an eavesdropper 
doesn‟t know the secret key after it has been 
generated, that they would have a minimal 
chance of being able to do any meaningful 
interception on the classical channel.  An 
eavesdropper can prevent communication by 
suppressing either the classical or quantum 
channel, but this will not fool Alice or Bob into 
thinking the network is safe. 
 
The protocols inner workings are obviously well 
reasoned out and do indeed create an 
unconditionally secure system.  Also, the paper 
makes good use of tables to clarify and 
summarise the facts.  The paper has no 
conclusion, only results of the logical reasoning.  
Reflecting on it from a current perspective, it 
reasonable to conclude that with the BB84 
protocol having been conceived in theory it 
would have potential for error when practically 
implemented.  It is logical that something 
created only as a concept should come across 
certain issues when it is first built.  While minor 
improvements can be made to an idea before it 
is put into practice, it is only when it is truly 
tested by application of the idea that it can start 
to have its problems properly highlighted and 
addressed. As this is theoretical, the research 
falls under the category of basic and the use of 
hard numbers means it is also quantitative.  
 
It has been proven that it is possible to exploit 
the fact that a single-photon detector‟s pause 
after a detection event leave‟s it vulnerable to an 
attack without leaving any noticeable difference 
in the error rate (Weier et al, 2011).   This 
research is valid, as QKD is used on a lot of 
high-security networks and any attacks on these 
networks should be addressed as soon as 
possible. 
 
The paper claims that, using a standard BB84 
protocol setup network, the single photon 
avalanche detector (SPAD) can be forced into 
dead time and effectively blinded, by well timed 
pulses sent by an eavesdropper. 
 
This is an important idea being explored.  If 
QKD is proven to have vulnerabilities, then it is 
important that they are addressed as quickly as 
possible if it is to have any long term presence 
as a high security product.  It wouldn‟t take 
much to make people think twice about how 
many more weaknesses haven‟t been noticed yet 
after the first questions are raised about the no 
longer unconditional security QKD provides. 
 
The paper goes on to discuss an experiment in 
which they used standard hardware found in 
almost all QKD networks and they also setup 
the pulse timing to a proper length for unbiased 
detections. They then proceed to use blinding 
pulses to blind the SPAD and while the SPAD is 
blinded, Eve can detect these instead without 
being noticed.  After an attack, Eve then uses 
what she has learned about the secret key to 
decode information sent on the classical 
channel.  The results are based on how well Eve 
can read the contents of the classical channel. 
After this, the experiment is repeated with 
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increasing intensities of the blinding pulse and 
the results are compared. 
 
This is a very fair and unbiased experimental 
method.  It is also effective in getting to the nub 
of the issue, by actually having Eve listen in on 
the classical channel afterwards.  If the 
experiment was limited to how much of the 
shared secret key Eve could discover, the results 
would be much more limited.  It seems likely 
that each element was tested several times and 
that an average of the results was taken, but this 
is not specifically mentioned. 
 
The outcome of the experiment shows that at the 
lowest pulse intensity, the classical channel‟s 
data was barely discernable from being random, 
but the best result demonstrated that 98.83% of 
the classical data could be correctly discerned 
(see Fig 3.)   
 
 
Figure 3. This image shows examples of 
increasing intenstity using blinding pulses to 
attack the quantum channel in a QKD 
network.  It is clear that, there is a significant 
amount of data intercepted at the highest 
intensity  (Weier et al, 2011, p.8) 
 
This falls in line with the predictions that were 
made, with the exception of some of the higher 
values not quite matching up in real life because 
of the greater chance of interference caused by 
generating the more intense pulses.  To 
conclude, they point out that the attack is 
currently potent and applies to the vast majority 
of QKD networks.  Its strengths are in how easy 
it is to perform.  However, the ease of 
implementation also leads to an ease of 
detection.  If Bob checks for detection events 
outside of the pulse timing that Alice is sending 
with, then they are probably a pulse attack.  
However, Eve can instead send blinding pulses 
at random times during the window in which 
Alice‟s pulses arrive and simulate background 
noise.  They suggest a more efficient 
countermeasure would be to monitor the voltage 
of the SPAD to be sure there is nothing 
malicious going on.   
 
This outcome is a good and unbiased 
interpretation of the results and it is always most 
useful to see a security breach with a well 
reasoned idea to patch the security hole.  This 
vulnerability is a significant one, and until it is 
countered by adding new elements to the 
standard QKD networks, there is definitely a 
real threat.  The paper uses an actual scientific 
experiment generating hard data to reach its 
conclusions and therefore falls under applied 
and quantitative research. 
 
(Wang et al, 2009) Proposes that is possible to 
perform a man-in-the-middle attack on the 
BB84 protocol.  Again, much like Weier‟s 
paper, this is a valid research topic, as it deals 
with a threat to QKD, which has a lot of security 
responsibility and finding and stopping exploits 
is important.  
 
They say this attack would involve a malicious 
Mallory, in place of the eavesdropping Eve, 
intercepting the secure quantum messages 
between Alice and Bob.  To do this, Mallory 
must place herself in between Alice and Bob on 
the quantum channel.  When Alice sends Bob 
the first random bits with their random 
polarisations, Mallory intercepts this and sends a 
separate random set of bits with random 
polarisations to Bob.  Bob then replies with the 
series of detectors he randomly selected and 
sends this information to Alice, but again, this is 
intercepted and Alice is sent Mallory‟s detector 
information instead.  At this point, Bob and 
Alice only keep the bits that were properly 
detected and therefore have two different secret 
keys.  Finally, Bob and Alice send each other 
part of their key and verify that they match, in 
order to be sure there were no eavesdroppers.  
At this point, Mallory can receive Alice‟s key 
bits and confirm Mallory‟s with Bob. Then 
Mallory confirms Alice has the correct code.  At 
this point, they will start to use the shared secret 
on the classical channel and Mallory can 
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intercept data from one user, decrypt it and 
encrypt it with the other key before sending it to 
the other user.   
 
If this is true, then it would be a severe threat to 
the security of QKD.  However, while there is 
no reason to doubt that it is possible to perform 
a man-in-the-middle attack like this one, it is not 
proven either by backing it up with existing 
evidence, or demonstrating any sort of 
experiment. 
 
The paper continues to discuss means of 
preventing man-in-the-middle attacks on a 
quantum system.  It claims the core of this 
problem is not being able to verify who the 
users are communicating with.  It then lists a 
number of possible solutions.  First, they suggest 
that digital certificates could be used, to verify 
the authenticity of a sender.  Secondly, they 
recommend using a secure key to encrypt the 
authentication message with.  Thirdly, they put 
forward the idea of using Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen pairs, being shared between Alice and 
Bob. Alice would send her pairs with the very 
first set of random bits and tell Bob which is 
entangled.  Bob would then detect the 
interrelated pairs and see if there is correlation.  
The next option would be to check that Alice 
and Bob‟s completed shared secrets match by 
sending then by phone or email, which is at 
lower risk of interception.  Alternatively, the 
shared keys could be compared on the classical 
channel.  Finally, they mention that a man-in-
the-middle attack is difficult to practically 
implement, because information is difficult to 
intercept at each stage.  If anything is not 
intercepted, it is possible that the attack will be 
discovered and the key discarded. 
 
Once again, while these claims seem to make 
sense, they are not backed up by any evidence.  
Furthermore, there are elements which are 
written in such bad English that it is difficult, or 
impossible, to make useful sense of. 
 
The paper concludes by saying that QKD is 
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, but 
could be protected from this by introducing 
elements of classical cryptography.  It also 
suggests it might be possible to include other 
elements of quantum cryptography, like security 
based on Quantum non-cloning theorem or the 
uncertainty theory.  They also mention that 
Quantum non-cloning theorem has a big role in 
quantum computing, but has been truly proven, 
because research cannot claim that there is no 
way of cloning at all.  They make a comparison 
to human beings, and that before discovering the 
gene, nobody would have said human cloning 
was possible.  They say it may be possible to, in 
the future, discover a quantum gene, which will 
allow us to clone quantum states, at which point, 
the security of QKD would be severely 
threatened. 
 
They have not come up with a strong conclusion 
or with any discernible new knowledge in this 
paper, the whole paper is a list of events, 
without any proof that any of the elements core 
to the title, „Man-in-the-middle Attack on BB84 
Protocol and is Defence‟.  There are six 
references in the paper, two are on QKD in 
general and feature in the introduction, while the 
other four are in the conclusion, and two of 
those are on quantum non-cloning.  The 
introduction of Quantum non-cloning into the 
paper was a deviation and bears no relation to 
the title.  The paper skips from the introduction, 
to the attack and defence of man-in-the-middle, 
and finally to the conclusion.  In general, this 
paper seems thin on useful information and none 
of what it claims is proven by referencing or by 
experiment.  This paper technically falls into a 
basic approach to research, in that there is no 
physical testing, however there are no examples 
of quantitative nor qualitative research at any 
point. 
3 Conclusions 
Bennett and Brassard‟s paper on QKD is a well 
written concept, and while it may not live up to 
the idea of unconditional security in reality as 
well as it does in theory, it is at least providing a 
platform for securing further against attacks.  It 
is unlikely that the authors envisaged a time 
where there protocol would be fully realised and 
implemented. 
 
The papers of Weier and Wang both put 
forward problems within a QKD system, which 
can be exploited, but more importantly, 
protected against.  Both of their topics have 
equal validity, but only Weier really seemed to 
do the title justice. Additionally, Weier‟s 
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contribution has a more feasible problem to 
discuss, and has a problem which is put into 
context with evidence.  
 
Weier‟s research has a fair and un-biased 
experiment, which has relevant results, while 
Wang has no experiment.  While, they cover 
different enough topics that both of their 
suggestions to solve the issues they covered 
could be implemented together, this still leaves 
the concern that one might question 
implementing the man-in-the-middle protection 
based on a lack of evidence.     
 
In the context of the commercial side of QKD, 
the idea that QKD was unconditionally secure 
was the biggest draw, and this is no longer true.  
It was probably not a good idea to herald a new 
era of complete security so quickly, without 
giving it a chance to be properly tested.  
Obviously, the holes in the QKD network can be 
patched, but ultimately, now that there have 
been successful breaches, it is highly likely there 
will be more, based on the common trends in 
classical security.  Certainly QKD is not a bad 
security protocol, as it is a very specialist 
attacker who has the tools and ability to hack a 
QKD system.  This is the most significant 
redeeming quality of the network at the moment.  
 
The real question is, how long will it be before 
hackers either start to learn the elements of the 
security system well enough to perform an 
attack? Or how long before someone who 
already has this knowledge is lured by greed or 
bribery or force to attack a QKD network?  This 
is a real unknown.   Despite all of QKD‟s 
problems, it remains secure more out of 
ignorance than out of it putting up a good 
defence.  The only thing that is for certain is that 
it will not stay this way forever. 
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A Critical Review of Current Distributed Denial of Service Prevention 
Methodologies 
  
Paul Mains 
 
Abstract 
This research paper is in the field of improving online security. It will be 
narrowing the focus on defending against distributed denial of service attacks. 
This is a well-documented area with high profile attacks perpetrated by 
„hacktivist‟ group „anonymous‟ and mischief makers „lulzsec‟. These aren‟t the 
only groups or individuals that attempt these attacks. Anyone with the ability to 
download simple software packages like the „Low Orbit Ion Cannon‟ can 
execute an attack at a web server or someone‟s internet connection. That is the 
main obstacle to overcome that the attacks can be made so simple that any Joe 
Blogs can participate in a mass illegal destructive activity. There are more 
advanced approaches that are harder to predict. It could be the more advanced 
„High Orbit Ion Cannon‟ package or the manipulation of the „Conficker‟ virus.  
A DDoS can even be produced by a single individual manipulating a distributed 
hash table directing a massive amount of traffic towards a target. How these 
attacks can be avoided will be the focus of this research paper. Attention will be 
around „Genetic Algorithms‟, „Neural Classifiers‟, „P2P defending‟ and how to 
defend the future of cloud computing from the frustrations of DDoS attacks.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
One of the most well-known approaches to 
antagonise a person (a person using a computer 
that is) from a significant distance away is to 
undertake a DoS or DDoS attack against them. 
This is starting to move over to the newer 
sensation called RefRef, but we‟ll only 
concentrate on the DDoS problem. The biggest 
problem is that DDoS is not produced from a 
highly refined complicated methodology, it is a 
simple crude annoyance distributed to people 
with no substantial hacking skills, therefore easy 
to undertake. So why hasn‟t this issue not been 
handled yet? Well technically DDoS is just one 
of many approaches being utilised, but none of 
the other approaches are considered to be 
impressive or even remotely complex either.  
 
“The low level of skills displayed is a worry in 
itself. If hacktivists are achieving this level of 
mayhem, imagine what real hackers might do.” 
(Mansfield-Devine 2011). The damage these 
people inflict is difficult to measure but side 
effects of having a weapon so easily obtainable 
can be easily facilitated to dark acts. Having a 
system vulnerable to such a basic attack causes 
damage in many ways.  
 Loss of money 
 Invasion of privacy 
 Loss of time 
 Mental anguish 
 Increase in Crime  
(Kim et al. 2011) 
In 2004 the ground work was already set in the 
paper “A taxonomy of DDoS attack and DDoS 
defense mechanisms” (Jelena & Reiher 2004). It 
has been 7 years since that research was carried 
out and it is now time to see where the research 
has progressed. 
2 DDoS Prevention Research 
In this area research papers will be analysed in 
the field of DDoS prevention. 4 Papers have 
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been chosen to be the focus of the investigation. 
These will be critically evaluated to determine 
the knowledge behind the approaches. The 4 
areas are covered in the following research 
papers: 
 “Detection of DDoS attacks using 
optimized traffic” (Lee et al. 2011) 
 “Distributed denial of service attack 
detection using an ensemble of neural 
classifier” (Kumar & Selvakumar 
2011) 
 “Preventing DDoS attacks on internet 
servers exploiting P2P systems” (Sun 
et al. 2010) 
 “Cloud security defence to protect cloud 
computing against HTTP-DoS and 
XML-DoS attacks” (Chonka et al. 
2011) 
 
2.1 Traffic Matrix 
The research by (Lee et al. 2011) is an applied 
quantitative piece of research dedicated to the 
goal of the detection of DDoS attacks. It contin-
ues on from the previous work “Detecting DDoS 
attacks using dispersible traffic matrix and 
weighted moving average” this is a heavily 
mathematical driven approach to a network se-
curity issue. 
Analysis 
The problem that it is trying to tackle is the rise 
in DDoS threats effecting networks. It clearly 
identifies the different fields of DDoS defence. 
“Defense mechanisms against DDoS attacks to 
cope with them can be classified into four cate-
gories: prevention, detection, mitigation and 
response.” (Lee et al. 2011) This research pro-
ject is designed to detect the anomalies that in-
dicate a DDoS attack is occurring. They verify 
their approach by undertaking an experiment 
and analyses process. The tests that are per-
formed involve the use of advanced mathemati-
cal data sets. The research from a graphical per-
spective is quite revealing. What the experiment 
is exploring is the validity of the equation be-
low. 
 
 
Figure 1 Variance Equation (Lee et al. 
2011) 
 That is what is made to identify the variance 
which is value „V‟. Basically if V exceeds the 
designated threshold the system is alerted to this 
occurrence. This is then identified as an 
anomaly and the mass generation of these 
anomalies aided by visual referencing is the 
detection measure. The steps are illustrated 
below. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Overall flow of proposed 
model (Lee et al. 2011) 
 
 
The approach does in fact display a visual aid to 
identify when the attack takes place. This is 
illustrated in the diagram on the next page which 
identifies the difference between a normal set of 
traffic results and a set of DDoS attack results.  
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Figure 3 Visualisation results of traffic 
matrix (Lee et al. 2011) 
 
The image above identifies the difference 
between a DDoS attack and a normal trend of 
traffic. How the normal traffic is scaled is not 
made apparent, whether that is an operation 
intensive network or if it is a particular calm 
timeframe. Seeing how this matrix is identifying 
anomalies it may not be important, but could be 
elaborated upon in further research to find the 
limits of its capabilities. Another feature of 
further research could be in the format of the IP 
addresses used. “We converted these sanitized 
source IP addresses to Ipv4 format, since our 
proposed model needs Ipv4 format as source IP 
addresses to construct a traffic matrix.” (Lee et 
al. 2011) Now that the experiment has produced 
results to be analysed it could progress to new 
environments to test the limits of this approach. 
This may warrant testing it in tandem with the 
IPv6 format. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The quantitative method of research displayed 
here is appropriate for the desired result. The 
resulting data sets do illuminate the success of 
the theory discussed prior. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 DARPA 2000 LLDOS 1.0 
with LBL-PKT-4 (Lee et al. 2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 16 bit subnet spoofed attack 
with LBL-PKT-4 (Lee et al. 2011) 
 
The graphs above display how the traffic matrix 
detects the DDoS successfully. The method is 
described as having a low amount of 
computational overhead and must have a 
minimal detection delay while producing high 
detection results. The way the experiment is 
conducted displays the trend between low 
overheads and high rate of detection. So the 
statistical evidence proves the authors proposed 
detection model has achieved its goal. The only 
thing to be raised is how it compares to other 
methodologies in this field. There is a neural 
classifier approach that I will use to compare 
this approach with. But as it stands now the 
detection model has reliably informed the reader 
of its inception and practicality and then 
justified through experimental trial. “We 
showed that our proposed approach satisfies the 
major requirements of the detection approach 
such as low processing overheads, short 
detection delay, and high detection rates” (Lee 
et al. 2011) How this is implemented into real 
world situations hasn‟t been experimented on as 
far as it has been covered in this research paper. 
A passing comment in the conclusion says that it 
is easily done, and elaborates slightly on how 
this can be done but as far as can be read it 
hasn‟t gone through a thorough testing phase. 
“our model can be used in a real-time network 
environment and it can be implemented easily” 
(Lee et al. 2011) It would be interesting to see 
how this approach fits with other detection 
models and security packages, whether it could 
be implemented into an operational security 
policy or not. 
 
2.2 Neural Classifier 
 
The research by (Kumar & Selvakumar 2011) is 
an applied quantitative piece of research, 
dedicated to improving the detection rate of 
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DDoS attacks by reducing the amount of false 
alarms. This is targeted at the network security 
audience that wish to progress their defences 
against resource draining attacks. This is also a 
method built primarily to detect attacks rather 
than prevent or respond. 
 
2.2.1 Analysis 
 
 
Figure 6 SSE environment (Kumar & 
Selvakumar 2011) 
 
 
This method triggers an alarmed state that 
communicates to other machines on that security 
network. This is a method that is already 
implemented and the focus of the research is to 
improve it by modifying the mathematical side. 
The obstacle at hand is to decipher what is 
malicious traffic and what is safe traffic. “Real 
Challenge lies in distinguishing the flooding 
attacks from abrupt change in legitimate traffic.” 
(Kumar & Selvakumar 2011) This is the main 
focus of what the algorithm is designed to 
achieve. It is created to differentiate between 
various kinds of traffic, by training the classifier 
to recognise current signatures and learn new 
traffic trends that can be gauged as a threat. 
How the method is implemented is illustrated on 
the top right of this page, the diagram at the start 
of this analyses section displays how it appears 
on a large scale. It is examined on a large 
distributed network and it is this large to give 
the method as much training data as possible. It 
is also useful as the experiments can be analysed 
in the larger context of the whole network or 
minimised to see how it operates at its smallest 
computational level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Architecture for DDoS at-
tack detection and response system 
(Kumar & Selvakumar 2011) 
 
 
 2.2.2 Conclusion 
The experiments that took place (there was 
multiple) were very detailed and rigorous. The 
proposed system uses a classifier named 
RBPBoost built off the RBP classifier. It was 
tested in 2 experiments using a range of data 
sets to give us an idea of how faster the 
algorithm is at detecting attacks while obtaining 
fewer false alarms. There are diagrams over the 
next page that shows us just a few of the results 
of how the algorithm faired against other current 
algorithms. The results can be hard to take in 
because of the amount of results that were 
presented. But the overriding consensus is that 
the proposed algorithm has a better detection 
rate, less false positives and lower cost. The cost 
is defined as the occurrence of misclassifying 
data. “Cost function is based on the number of 
samples that are misclassified.” (Kumar & 
Selvakumar 2011) This was previously 
identified during the work of Devi Parikh and 
Tsuhan Chen in their cost minimization paper. 
“the cost of a false alarm may be much higher 
than false detection” (Parikh & Chen 2008) 
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Table 1 Simulation results of 
classification algorithms of conficker 
dataset (Kumar & Selvakumar 2011) 
 
 
 
Table 2 Simulation results of 
classification algorithms for SSE 
dataset (Kumar & Selvakumar 2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Confusion matrix for the K-
Means Clustering (Kumar & 
Selvakumar 2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 9 Cost per sample for existing 
ensemble classifiers and RBPBoost 
(Kumar & Selvakumar 2011) 
 
So from what is gathered from those examples 
above (table of results, cost bar chart and the 
result matrix) it is evident that improvements 
have been made against other detection models. 
Progression is valuable for the online security 
field to keep up with the constant security 
threats that are conceived constantly. The 
methods of procuring these results were rigorous 
and detailed as evident by the range of results 
that have been discovered. The experiments 
were conceived with real world situations in 
mind having the large scale set up that was used 
create the precise results we have seen. “These 
applications/projects have inherently 
geographically distributed centers carrying out 
specific task/research, networked together to 
achieve the common goal.” (Kumar & 
Selvakumar 2011). 
 
2.3 Exploiting & Defending P2P  
 
This is a problem that has more to do with the 
general public as they can be used to target web 
servers and domestic connections. The P2P 
operations are quite common among the general 
public as software like „µTorrent‟ is well 
established among internet users. Using large-
scale distributed hash tables brings many 
unsuspecting participants into DDoS attacks as 
their traffic can be directed towards victims (As 
illustrated by the diagram below and on the next 
page). The research by (Sun et al. 2010) 
identifies the threats and discovers the defence 
against these approaches. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 (a) Normal operation and 
(b) attack (Sun et al. 2010)  
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Figure 11 Index poisoning attack in 
Overnet (Sun et al. 2010)  
 
 
2.3.1 Analysis 
This was inspired from the monitoring of DNS 
traffic which came up with some curious results. 
 
 
 
Figure 12 (a) Number of unsuccessful 
Kad flows sent to ports that received 
more than 500 unsuccessful flows. (b) 
Fraction of unsuccessful Kad flows to 
port that received more than 500 
unsuccessful flows (Sun et al. 2010) 
 
 
How these processes are combatted against in 
this paper is by 1
st
 knowing the range of 
amplification methods that can be deterred. 
Then afterwards the stage of enhancing the 
resilience against these kinds of attacks is 
enacted. “the key principles involved in limiting 
DDoS amplification is validating membership 
information.” (Sun et al. 2010) So from this 
insight a scheme was produced to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities within the P2P systems. The 
sequence of this scheme is illustrated at the top 
right of this page. 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Complete sequence of steps 
for normal buddy operations with 
probing-based validation mechanisms 
(Sun et al. 2010) 
 
 
The main points considered in this scheme are 
select criteria as to what methods will need to be 
used. These are implemented to enhance the 
P2P system‟s resilience against DDoS 
manipulation. The sequence displayed above is 
designed to be implemented in current P2P 
systems and the areas it covers are as follows: 
1. Use of centralized authorities 
2. DHT-specific approaches 
3. Corroboration from multiple sources 
4. Validating peers through active probing 
5. Preventing DDoS exploiting validation 
probes 
6. Source-throttling 
7. Destination-throttling 
8. Avoiding validation failures with NATs 
(Sun et al. 2010) 
 
The experiments implemented to test this 
scheme were utilised in real world conditions. 
Planetlab and the Kad network were the areas 
picked to test this method. 
 
2.3.2 Conclusion 
The data that has been produced in these 
environments are around how these methods 
impact performance within these systems. So the 
focus shifts from having a scheme that shields 
against the vulnerabilities inherent with P2P to 
also wanting to comply with achieving good 
system performance while doing so. There is a 
multitude of graphical data on display that won‟t 
be shown too much of in here. But the data does 
appear to be succinct in what it is presenting. 
There are many variables to consider in this 
experiment which is why the testing had to be 
very broad. In some instances the network 
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address translation (NAT) delay had increased 
around 9 times longer than when it was not 
under attack. By implementing their modified 
kad system (Resilient Kad) they reduced this 
delay to around 1.5 to 2 times the not under 
attack value. An improvement of between 4.5 
and 6 times the original systems performance. 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Average time a search 
takes to locate the index node, with 
different NAT percentages. Each bar 
is the average over fine runs. The 
error bars show the standard 
deviation. Measured in Kad (Sun et 
al. 2010) 
 
 
Now from that diagram it may be misunderstood 
as not a big deal, changing NAT response rates 
from 9 seconds to 2 seconds. But in that 
experiment it was only 5 attackers that were 
present. In real world scenarios attacks can be 
participated by hundreds maybe even thousands 
of different nodes. “There are five attackers that 
stay through the entire experiment and there is a 
single victim.” (Sun et al. 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Traffic seen at the victim as 
a function of time, with five attackers 
and 50% of the nodes behind NAT. 
Measured in Kad (Sun et al. 2010) 
 
 
The diagram above displays the massive 
difference in attack traffic between the base and 
the modified system. The difference being so 
large it is evident that this approach has had a 
dramatic effect on the impact of the DDoS 
attack. So the conclusion can be made that this 
applied research using quantitative methods has 
achieved its goal in reducing the impact of the 
DDoS attack. 
 
2.4 Cloud Security 
Cloud security when it comes to DDoS is in its 
infancy. An attack on a cloud infrastructure 
would have a crippling effect as the attack 
targets the cloud architectures main weakness. 
Cloud systems rely on the network infrastructure 
to function and by attacking it in this manner the 
resources become so depleted the cloud stops 
functioning. The research being undertaken is 
specifically against HTTP-DoS and XML-DoS 
kinds of attack. This is researched in depth by 
(Chonka et al. 2011). 
 
2.4.1 Analysis 
  The system being proposed is a cloud trace 
back and a neural network called „cloud 
protector‟. How this operates is illustrated 
below. This is called the Service-oriented 
traceback architecture (SOTA) model. 
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Figure 16 Distributed XML-based 
Denial of Service attack, where an 
attacker has taken control of 2 cloud 
networks and starts sending huge 
amounts of XML-based messages to 
Cloud 0 Web Server (Chonka et al. 
2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Distributed XML-based 
Denial of Service attack, where CTB 
and Cloud Protector are located just 
between each cloud Web Service, in 
order to detect and filter X-DoS 
attacks (Chonka et al. 2011) 
 
 
The problems this approach is meant to solve is 
what happened in the Iranian election in 2009. 
“the Iranian opposition coordinated an ongoing 
cyber attack that has successfully managed to 
disrupt access to major pro-Ahmadinejad 
Iranian web sites” (Danchev 2009). They even 
used this scenario in their experiment. The 
image on the next page displays how they 
thought this attack was perpetrated. 
“Demonstration of our three virtual machines 
with 20 Firefox browsers and 20 tabs open to 
the Page Reboot Website. The purpose of our 
demonstration was to replicate the attack that 
brought down the Iranian website.” (Chonka et 
al. 2011)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 18 Demonstration of Iranian 
attack 
 
 
2.4.2 Conclusion 
This was actually one of many works headed by 
Mr Ashley Chonka covering his PhD thesis 
“Protecting Web Services from Distributed 
Denial of Service Attacks”. So this an area he is 
improving on and in this paper he takes his 
previous research on “Chaos theory based 
detection against network mimicking DDoS 
attacks” (Chonka et al. 2009) and implemented 
it into the context of cloud computing. So that 
should explain why the conclusion isn‟t 
completely conclusive when it comes to 
verifying the success of the approach. He leaves 
the door open for future work in this area. This 
may be due to the results of his experiment not 
being concrete enough to be implemented on a 
larger scale. “We detected and filtered between 
88% and 91%, but we achieved a very large 
response variance due to a problem with the 
neural network settings” (Chonka et al. 2011) 
the findings of the cloud protector are that it 
isn‟t as powerful as it needs to be to be a 
reliable defense. The findings of the CTB are a 
bit different as it has been proven to work, but 
with a stipulation. The system is under greater 
strain when the CTB is identifying the attackers. 
“an increase in response time was generated by 
thirty percent. This increase means that during a 
DDoS attack, more processing time is required 
to handle the extra burden” (Chonka et al. 
2011). So what is required is a more stable 
cloud protector to mitigate the strain of the 
CTB. More research into this is needed because 
as it stands the system isn‟t reliable therefore not 
viable for commercial implementation. 
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4. Overall Conclusions 
Taking all of the previously discussed research 
papers into consideration the future of DDoS 
prevention seems strong. As is evident by the 
results from the various papers is that DDoS can 
be mitigated quite effectively. It is down to 
finding the right application of security and 
discovering what is portable to different 
architectures. Whatever system this may be it 
needs to have cloud computing at its foundation. 
“it is important to design distributed detection 
and defense system where heterogeneous nodes 
can collaborate over the network and monitor 
traffic in cooperative manner.” (Tariq et al. 
2011) The only way to combat any kind of 
distributed attack is with a distributed defence. 
It seems that the agenda of all of the research 
previously discussed are compatible, and that is 
what is needed to put an end to this threat. The 
detection matrix, neural classifier, concepts of 
P2P defence and the SOTA model all can be 
unified to strengthen the future systems from 
malicious resource draining attacks. 
 
All 4 of these areas have established a clear 
purpose in their investigation which has been 
relatable with each other. Whether it was 
focused on the detecting, mitigating, preventing 
or responding sides of the issue, the purpose is 
local to the need to defend against DDoS. 
 
All 4 have been rigorous with their quantitative 
experimental methods. Not only highlighting the 
successes derived from their hypothesis, but also 
discussing the issues that needs to be tackled. In 
the cloud defence research Mr Ashley Chonka 
identifies that his approach was not as effective 
as he liked it to be. Also the amount of rigor 
does vary. We can compare the experiments of 
(Lee et al. 2011) and (Kumar & Selvakumar 
2011) and notice that the degree of which these 
2 research groups worked can be seen to be at 
different levels of rigor. The experiments used 
to verify the operations of the neural classifier 
had more layers and covered a larger range of 
outcomes. Whereas the traffic matrix only used 
data sets to analyse its effectiveness. One used a 
large operating network when the other was 
observed in a smaller detached environment. 
Due to this more in depth approach the results of 
the neural classifier tests are deemed to be more 
reliable. 
Because content is quite advanced the testability 
is based on the skill set of the researcher. The 
methods have been outlaid in the research and 
have followed quantitative techniques to 
evaluate the validity of their research. In these 
experiments the measurement was always in 
how it can reduce the effectiveness of DDoS by 
measuring the reduction in traffic and responses. 
In all cases there was significant reduction to be 
seen as a technique to combat DDoS. How these 
can be reproduced can be quite difficult as 
previously mentioned the research is advanced 
in practise. But allowing for the same skill sets 
the reproduction of results is possible. In the 
case of the research by (Chonka et al. 2011) the 
experiment was a scenario dictated by twitter 
posts over the internet roughly discussing how 
the original attack was executed. So the 
experiment has the possibility of being flawed as 
the original circumstances could be different to 
what was casually discussed. “the attackers went 
on Twitter and various discussion forums 
announcing how to use the Page Rebooter 
website, by opening it up in many browser tabs 
and just leaving them to refresh the Iran 
Government website.” (Chonka et al. 2011). So 
in this case the reproducibility may be relying 
on false information. The other cases are mostly 
repeatable with standard equipment but the way 
the distributed neural classifier method by 
(Kumar & Selvakumar 2011) was approached 
was so large it would require large investment to 
replicate the same results. 
 
The precision of the discussed research is 
substantial due to its quantitative approach. The 
empirical data that lead to their conclusions was 
collected by measuring network traffic and 
going in to significant enough depth to ensure 
precise data relating to the detection or 
prevention of DDoS. Also elaborating on the 
collected data as to why the data has behaved in 
that specific way has helped decipher precision. 
For example in preventing DDoS exploitations 
of p2p the author explains how the network 
address translator has been improved because of 
the precise nature of the data. “Thus, its routing 
table could include nodes behind NAT, and 
many search messages could fail since nodes 
behind NAT are contacted, leading to longer 
search times.” (Sun et al. 2010) Without the 
precise measurement of how long the NAT 
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delay was, that conclusion could not be 
validated. 
 
The discussed research projects did have all the 
positives discussed in this conclusion but only 
two have the right to be praised for its 
generalizability. The way (Sun et al. 2010) 
utilised the Kad network and (Kumar & 
Selvakumar 2011) managed the SSE are 
examples of how experiments need to 
incorporate real world situations. Although the 
other 2 research projects can fit quite 
comfortably under the DDoS prevention 
umbrella, their experiments concentrated on the 
detection aspect in a more specific smaller 
environment. 
 
The confidence in these results is high based on 
their precision and rigorous approaches. But to 
bring some parsimony into the equation none of 
these individually are meant to solve the 
problem of DDoS. They require other areas to 
synchronise with these areas to produce a 
product that can cure this threat. The cloud 
defense approach needs a better neural classifier 
method and (Kumar & Selvakumar 2011) may 
already have that in their RBPBoost. Also to see 
the merits of the traffic matrix by (Lee et al. 
2011) then it could be valuable to test it under 
the conditions of a large neural network like 
(Kumar & Selvakumar 2011) utilised. If all 
these systems can be harmoniously linked 
together to produce a distributed defence 
network, then DDoS‟s days may be numbered. 
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An Evaluation of Current Computing Methodologies Aimed at 
Improving the Prevention of SQL Injection Attacks in Web Based 
Applications 
 
Niall Marsh 
 
Abstract 
SQL Injection attacks are now common place within the World Wide Web and 
the development of online applications utilizing web based databases.  
Combating these attacks is the responsibility of designers, programmers and 
developers who must use a myriad of techniques in their arsenal to neutralise the 
threat of these attacks.  This paper examines new methodologies being 
researched for combating SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIA) through detecting 
vulnerabilities in an applications source code and discussion is given to the use 
and deployment of these techniques..  
 
1 Introduction 
Online security is a key fundamental factor that 
must be considered by any company or organi-
zation that utilizes online functionality in its 
application.  Information security breaches can 
have significant ramifications for both users and 
developers of a system typically loss of personal 
data, legal proceedings through the introduction 
of the Data Protection Act 1998,   financial and 
or fiscal costs through fraud/theft and loss of 
revenue, compensation pay-outs, com-
pany/brand reputations and market integrity.   
 
Research carried out by Impervia (2011) 
claimed that as of July 2011, 357,292,065 indi-
vidual sites make up the internet.  From Decem-
ber 2010 through to May 2011 Impervia‟s Ap-
plication Defence Centre monitored more than 
10 million individual web application attacks, 
23% of these attacks were categorized as SQL 
Injection Attacks Impervia (2011). 
 
Programmers and developers must be aware of 
current up to date hacking techniques and re-
search aimed at defending against them. Re-
search strategies can be categorised into two 
main common areas, Vulnerability Detec-
tion/Identification and Assault Detection and 
Prevention.  This research review will focus on 
different research methods for both strategies.   
2 Vulnerability Detection Identifi-
cation 
Vulnerability detection for SQLIA is the first 
line defence in preventing attacks and involves 
analysing source code for SQL insertion most 
commonly through black box testing or static 
analysis within the development environment.  
Several systems have been proposed in current 
research to address vulnerability detection such 
as “Patching Vulnerabilities with Sanitization 
Synthesis” (Yu et al. 2011) and “CANDID: Dy-
namic candidate evaluations for automatic pre-
vention of SQL injection attacks” (Bisht et al. 
2010) which uses similar methodology in its 
approach to the SAFELI model discussed in the 
next section.  Additionally primary research has 
been carried out into creating automated test 
generators purely for testing the integrity of a 
DBMS web application “Generating Effective 
Attacks for Efficient and Precise Penetration 
Testing against SQL Injection” (Kosuga et al. 
2011) discusses a novel approach and although 
relevant to the research covered in this literature 
review, further discussion of the topic will not 
be conducted in this paper as the Kosuga et al. 
(2011) research focuses on developing strategies 
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for creating attack patterns across multiple web 
platforms and applications live on the web and 
does not interrogate the source code directly or 
detect vulnerabilities . 
2.1 SAFELI 
Xiang Fu et al. (2007) have carried out research 
into building an automated framework called 
SAFELI to dynamically inspect bytecode of 
ASP.net applications identifying insertion points 
for SQL.  Once detected, SAFELI scrutinizes 
the code identifying uninitialized variables and 
replaces them with symbolic constraints.  Tags 
are added to the SQL insertion point to trigger 
the constraint solver.  When ran through the 
constraint solver, satisfiability is checked 
against the constraint and values are assigned 
for the variable.  Now modified the SAFELI 
framework activates a Test Case Generator 
which posts the variable in HTML format to a 
web server and then monitors the result sent 
back.  If vulnerabilities are detected in the 
response, error message traces are created and 
flags are tagged to the event, identifying the 
error.   
 
The researchers in this paper have focused their 
research into the adapting applications in the 
.NET framework, SQL injection methodology 
and development of data security. In order 
develop an effective strategy to create their 
detection system, particular attention has been 
paid to identifying and highlighting an 
anthology of SQL injection attack methods and 
have given explanations as to how methods 
adopted by the SAFELI framework counteract 
these threats.  The research team give 
supposition that other current systems either in 
production or development for vulnerability 
detection are less accurate than the SAFELI 
framework however, no comparative study, 
analysis or justification is given for the 
statement.  As SAFELI is still in current 
development no real-time evaluation of 
productivity or effectiveness of the framework 
has yet been conducted, however, the research 
team have stated that they intend on testing the 
system on several open source applications 
available on the internet and developed a test 
suite to verify the accuracy and ability of 
SAFELI.  Theoretical examples have been used 
throughout the paper to demonstrate the model 
and formal proof has been used to validate the 
results of the framework in action.   Xiang Fu et 
al. (2007) state “the technique can handle hybrid 
constraints that involve Boolean, integer and 
string variables” which would enable the 
framework to detect true/false inputs on system 
flags and inputs as well as detecting number 
variables not inputted as strings.  Contradictory 
to this, evidence shown within the examples of 
the article only use one string variable, 
throughout and no demonstration of opposing 
data types are given demonstrating the handling 
of Boolean or integer variables. 
 
Adopting this method of initially scanning the 
bytecode of a .NET application for insertion of 
SQL parameters allows this method to test any 
.NET application in particular the ASP.net 
framework which processers user input from 
web applications typically through POST and 
GET transactions from form fields within 
HTML script. ASP.net handles the SQL 
statements which communicate with an online 
database.    SAFELI is currently not in 
production and therefore cannot be adopted or 
adapted to a current operational .NET system or 
application. Performance and efficiency of the 
framework currently cannot be guaranteed until 
further testing and development has been 
completed.  SAFELI has only been designed to 
work in parallel with .NET applications and 
would not be able to test contrary frameworks or 
languages such as PHP or JavaScript as SAFELI 
performs its algorithms in conjunction with the 
Microsoft Information Server.   The framework 
currently has only been designed to detect 
vulnerabilities within an application and it is left 
for the developer/programmer to patch any 
errors retrospectively. To further advance the 
framework and enhance its usability, a solutions 
module could be introduced into the framework 
such as in the PSR Generator method, which 
would automatically fix any subsequent 
vulnerability that was detected; this would 
further reduce the possibility of an attack 
penetrating the application or database.  
2.2 PSR-Algorithm & Generator 
Thomas et al. (2009) have devised a unique 
approach for automatic vulnerability detection 
within a class object orientated environment.  
The PRS algorithm identifies SQLIV from 
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within the source code through dynamic analy-
sis.  Once detected the PRS algorithm separates 
the SQL statement into structure and input using 
prepared statements, these prepared statements 
are created by the PSR Generator. Reformatted, 
the SQL statement still has its structure but the 
inputs have been replaced with placeholders 
resulting in the vulnerability being removed.  
Converting SQL to prepared statements can be 
time consuming especially for large complex 
applications and models as each line of code 
needs to be physically analysed by the developer 
or tester, searching for SQL inputs and modify-
ing the statements accordingly.  Using the PSR 
model can significantly reduce this time through 
its automation which in return can have signifi-
cant cost implications when developing an ap-
plication as less time spent coding is needed to 
bring the application to market. Automating this 
process also reduces the potential for human 
error-prone actions however, for the system to 
be effective the developer must conform to strict 
coding practices. Poor coding structure and syn-
tax could lead to a potential risk of vulnerabili-
ties being undetected in the application.  Run-
ning within the ECLIPSE IDE the algorithm has 
been written in JAVA for use in native or web 
driven applications.  One of the primary reasons 
for this is that JAVA and Eclipse are both open 
source and free to use and adapt by developers.  
Being open source would allow this solution to 
be accessible to many programmers as JAVA 
and Eclipse are both widely used throughout the 
software industry Capra et al. (2011). Due to the 
method and structure in which the system has 
been created using common syntax methodol-
ogy, PSR could easily be adapted to other object 
orientated programming language, Thomas et al. 
(2009).  Allowing this adaptation would enable 
the system to test and fix a greater number of 
applications such as programs created in PHP, 
ASP, JavaScript or Pearl, again all open source, 
readily available software solutions. 
 
As with the researchers of the SAFELI model, 
Thomas et al. (2009) conducted extensive re-
search in SQLIA and evaluated the current tech-
niques that are being adopted in similar solu-
tions.  An outline of how PSR has been designed 
to counteract these threats and how it differs 
from other methods has been comprehensively 
documented and the concept of PSR has been 
well structured in several subsection of the pa-
per, explaining the logic and action of the algo-
rithm, its implementation and its limitations.  To 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the model the 
research team carried out tests of 4 online open 
source applications using the PSR Algorithm 
and Generator to analyse the source code of the 
applications, detect the vulnerabilities and mod-
ify the code appropriately.  To measure the va-
lidity of the experiments, test case suites were 
devised ensuring the security of the replaced 
code had been achieved and the original func-
tionality of the SQL statement was still intact.   
Results from the test showed that the PSR model 
removed 94% of SQLIV and justification was 
given for why the model did not manage to 
achieve 100% detection.  Recommendations are 
also given into how the model can be developed 
in the future to further improve its reliability and 
accuracy with speculation that 100% detection 
rates may be possible.  
 
PSR researchers Thomas et al. (2009) have 
demonstrated in the paper a successful and 
efficient approach for detecting SQLIV and 
performing countermeasures directly into the 
source code.  Adopting this model allows the 
developer to conventionally write the code in 
their normal style. Providing the programmer 
adheres to conventional language syntax 
protocols they can then run the algorithm and 
see the changes that have been made verifying 
back that the vulnerabilities have been fixed and 
the application will be secure and ready for 
release.  At this point using the SAFELI method 
the coder would now need to concentrate and 
spend valuable time on fixing the vulnerabilities 
detected within the application; this however 
would be taken care of   by the PSR Generator.  
A benefit of the PSR model is the ability to run 
the algorithm on pre written code allowing any 
JAVA application to be tested and secured.  
Software production companies who may have 
developed many applications would need to 
invest a considerably large percentage of their 
resources to evaluate the security risks 
embedded within their applications.  PSR has 
the potential to offer a solution to reduce this 
resource allocation considerably with a high 
success rate.  As currently there is only a 
guaranteed success rate of 94%, programmers 
will need to be made aware of the limitations of 
the system and compensation efforts will need to 
be made in these instances using an alternative 
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method to prevent the SQLIA when developing 
or modifying an application. 
3 Assault Detection and Prevention 
Assault Detection and Prevention is a 
methodology that monitors a system or 
application at runtime for injection attacks and 
performs an action to prevent the database or 
application being compromised during 
operation.  Research carried out in this approach 
focuses primarily on communication between 
backend database management systems and the 
web based application.  “A Specification-based 
Approach for SQL-Injection Detection” 
(Konstantinos 2008) is research carried out in 
2008 that looked at creating a simple interface 
between the two mechanisms, monitoring and 
comparing the structure of the SQL statement 
inputs against a stored library of validated SQL 
structures.  Further developments in this area of 
research were conducted by Felt et al. (2011) 
who have progressed with a similar system 
method with the introduction of a proxy driver 
between the two mechanisms called DIESEL. 
3.1 DIESEL 
A separate approach conducted by researchers at 
Berkley University investigate the use of Proxy 
based Architecture and User Based Access Con-
trol to prevent SQLIA with a system called 
DIESEL.  The model adopts a policy of “least 
privilege state” (Felt et al. 2011).  When in-
voked the framework breaks down an applica-
tion into modules and assigns database privilege 
access to the minimum requirement needed for 
the successful operation and function of the 
module, essentially providing a restricted con-
nection to the database.  The second component 
to the functionality of DIESEL is its proxy 
driver.  The proxy driver becomes the link and 
detection system between the web application 
and the database.  Using Data Separation the 
proxy sets restriction policies on the module‟s 
connections and then the proxy communicates 
and monitors the requests and responses from 
the database detecting any anomalies, removing 
an attack statement if detected, Felt et al. 
(2011). 
 
To conduct the research and development of 
DIESEL, the team have focused on existing 
research into SQLIA methodologies, counter-
measures for prevention of SQLIA, database 
authentication, database access control, data 
pooling, multiplexing and proxy services.   To 
evaluate the performance and eligibility of 
DIESEL, 3 popular web based applications were 
retrofitted with the prototype framework through 
modification of the applications source code.  
The applications were then evaluated against 
one know documented SQLIAV previously de-
tected within its own framework.  Results shown 
from the test, did detect an intercept the attack 
successfully.  No extended testing had been 
conducted by the team to test if all vulnerabili-
ties and possible attack patterns could success-
fully be intercepted by the model; however, 
theoretical examples were given demonstrating 
the actions of the DIESEL in action.  Before 
DIESEL could be adapted to live operational 
web applications, additional testing would need 
to be completed, especially on large modular 
applications to verify the performance and effi-
ciency of the multiplexing proxy, and user ac-
cess control driver.  Examples and statistics 
have been given depicting the modifications 
DIESEL performs during retrofitting, showing 
the total lines of code that need modification 
and the total number of policies created to se-
cure the application.  Applications such Drupal 
and WordPress showed only a minimal amount 
of modifications were needed to be implement 
the model, however, one application, JForum 
needed over 80% more modifications than the 
previous two.  This neither proves nor disproves 
the success of the research or the application but 
does demonstrate that the system could prove to 
be complicated and time consuming when retro-
fitting a large complex application.  The pre-
liminary research has shown relatively positive 
results in the areas tested; demonstrating the 
concept and benefits of data separation and how 
they can be applied in preventing SQLIA. Dis-
cussion has been given on the models limitations 
notably a high computational overhead on per-
formance of 73% during operation and a de-
scription is given on the inability to modify cer-
tain code in specific instances. 
 
Application of the DIESEL framework cannot 
yet be guaranteed as a successful candidate for 
the detection of SQLIA due to inconsistencies in 
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the testing and further development is required 
to patch the limitations of the model.  Testing of 
the DIESEL model has shown a high 
computational overhead that may be 
inappropriate for large or high level usage web 
application, adding additional resource 
requirements to the database server. Due to the 
methodology and system implementation of the 
model, access to the application source code is 
needed and cannot simply interact between 
application and the database.  In addition, code 
verification of the policies library needs to be 
independently tested to ensure security and 
functionality has been achieved; again 
potentially very time consuming for large 
complex or multiple applications. 
4 Conclusions 
Articles examined in this literature review have 
explored research into varying methods 
currently being adopted in software engineering, 
to combat the threat posed by SQL injection 
attacks.  Evaluation of these different models 
and strategies has highlighted both the strengths 
and weaknesses of the individual frameworks 
and their design implementation. Explanations 
have been given as to how they can be applied 
in real time environment situations and what 
impact can be expected of them.  Conclusions 
drawn from the research have identified that 
none of the systems offer guaranteed detection 
or elimination of SQLIA or SQLIV in their 
method and further research must be carried out 
to enhance web application security.  Overall the 
PSR model has demonstrated to be the most 
effective example of the models discussed at 
removing vulnerabilities and has the added 
advantage of having the functionality to rectify 
source code, patching the fault.  Minimal effort 
is needed to adopt the method into new and 
existing programs or applications and has the 
ability to be adapted to many other 
programming languages.  Further research of the 
PSR model is expected to yield improved results 
potentially allowing it to remove 100% of all 
vulnerabilities.   Introduction of proxy services 
to monitor and restrict access between an 
application and its database do show the 
potential to keep an application secure, but due 
to their nature and functionality incur high 
computational overheads which may be 
impractical, especially in an application such as 
Facebook or Twitter that conduct several 
million transactions an hour. Evidence does 
show higher success rates of an implemented 
model when programmers adopt secure 
conventional coding practices during the 
development cycle paying particular attention to 
modules of code that contain embedded SQL 
statements.  Even when using an automated 
checking system such as SAFELI or PSR 
validation analysis still need to be performed to 
check the stability and security of the system.  
Standing alone each research method has its 
own benefits and limitations; combining 
techniques to reduce vulnerabilities in an 
applications source code and monitoring the 
application at runtime to detect a possible attack 
would greatly reduce the risk of data being 
compromised and would further maintain the 
integrity of the system. 
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An Evaluation of Proposals to Detect Cheating in Multiplayer Online 
Games 
Bradley Peacock 
Abstract 
With the advent of broadband came the exponential explosion and popularity of online 
gaming, in particular Massively Multiplayer Online Games (MMOG's). This is seen as fun 
for most people but it has become a platform for others to develop their hacking skills. I am 
going to evaluate current research methods designed to detect cheating in MMOG's and de-
termine if their proposed solutions are effective in combating or even stopping online gam-
ing cheating.   
 
1    Introduction 
The number of people who play games online is 
rising year on year. Advances in graphics and faster 
CPU's along with fast broadband connections 
means that online games are more popular than 
ever. According to Ki and Cheon (2004), the sub-
scription MMOG market alone was worth $1.6 bil-
lion in 2009.  
 
The traditional network infrastructure that MMOG's 
are built upon is the Client/Server Model. The cost 
to implement such a system can be substantial as it 
requires a large investment in hardware resources, 
computing power and network bandwidth. And with 
the actual development of a game potentially cost-
ing up to and including $20 million, Reynolds 
(2010), the developers need to generate as much 
return revenue as possible. 
 
With the Client/Server approach being the most 
widely used model, it should make it hard to cheat 
as the developers have sole ownership of the serv-
ers. And with the business premise of MMOG's 
being subscriptions the provider needs to be total 
control of this to allow or deny players based on 
who has paid their subscriptions and the 
Client/Server model provides this functionality. 
 
A cheaper alternative platform is the peer-2-peer 
model but as the game is distributed amongst 
clients, security concerns are raised severely as it is 
harder to detect and prevent cheating although re-
search has been done to try and improve security on 
the Peer-to-Peer architecture, Kabus and Buchmann 
(2008), Kabus et all (2005). 
 
Research has also been carried out as to why people 
cheat, Kabus, Terpstra, Cilia and Buchmann 
(2005), Joshi (2008). By manipulating the source 
code, the ultimate aim is to gain an unfair advan-
tage over the other players and possibly a reputa-
tion within the gaming community, whether this is 
achieved through a highest score, progression 
through a game the quickest, or buying illegally 
copied items from other gamers to short-cut a game. 
There is even a virtual market place for people to 
buy and trade virtual avatars and  property which 
earns them real money, Kabus, Terpstra, Cilia and 
Buchmann (2005). 
 
And so with cost involved in developing, produc-
ing, deploying and maintaining an online game, it's 
imperative for the developers to keep cheats out of 
the game because it could drive away honest play-
ers who can't compete with the cheats, thus result-
ing in lost revenue. However one thing that is al-
most inevitable is flaws at the design stage of a 
game and this is the source of most hacks as hack-
ers exploit these oversights, Laurens et all (2007). 
One aspect of current computing research is aimed 
at detecting whether a human being is in control of 
the game and inputting commands, or whether an 
automated player agent, commonly referred to as a 
'gamebot' or 'bot', has been implemented to input 
commands. The research is aimed at providing the 
ability to find out. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents and evaluates the five technical pro-
posals researched which aim to achieve the same 
goal. Section 3 is a critical evaluation of the re-
search and the paper concludes in section 4 with 
synthesis of what has been learnt from sections 2 
and 3. 
2    Presentation and Evaluation 
It would appear that most players in the gaming 
community disagree with the use of bots as most 
players will put a lot of effort into earning various 
achievements and also gaining rewards. Several 
anti-cheat software programs have been developed 
to combat cheating, such as Punkbuster and Game-
Guard but they can't prevent all bots. Ki and Cheon 
(2007), analyse and classify known attacks and also 
categorize these attacks into layers, helping to se-
gregate the attacks which could possibly help focus 
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the development of an anti-cheat software program, 
specifically aimed at certain attacks. However this 
research which has been compiled aims to deter-
mine whether or not a human is in control, by using 
various methods, regardless of what category the 
attack falls under. 
2.1 CAPTCHA's 
It may not initially sound difficult in distinguishing 
human players from bots as the abilities of the two 
are quite different, but a bot can be injected into a 
game controlling an avatar just like a human con-
trolled one, only a little quicker and more respon-
sive, predicting and reacting to a scenario quicker 
than any human could. And so Golle and Duche-
neaut (2005), propose the use of a variety of tests, 
which can tell humans and computers apart, collec-
tively known as Completely Automated Public Tur-
ing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart 
(CAPTCHA's), Von Ahn et all (2003).They pro-
pose to apply them in both hardware and software 
tests with the hardware tests being versatile enough 
for use in a wide variety of online games. A capture 
test works by presenting challenges that are simple 
for humans to solve but are difficult for a computer 
to solve, Pau  all (2010). The most implemented 
CAPTCHA tests rely on humans‟ to ability to rec-
ognize randomly distorted text or images, Pau et all 
(2010).  
 
The hardware proposal is to turn input devices such 
as a mouse or joystick into CAPTCHA devices. If 
the CAPTCHA device is rendered tamper proof 
there would be no other way for input signals to be 
sent to the game software other than physically inte-
racting through the device. The signals would then 
be authenticated either at the game server or to the 
game software running on the machine. They be-
lieve a machine could physically interact with the 
hardware device but a human would be much faster 
and more reliable where reactions are critical. This 
could also apply to games played using a keyboard 
but they state to render a keyboard tamper-proof 
could be difficult and expensive to design, however 
the research does not state that they have ap-
proached any manufacturers to ascertain how much 
the cost would be. Perhaps if the authors had taking 
this into consideration then the proposal would be 
more substantiated as  a lot of games are played 
using a mouse/joystick and a keyboard. They claim 
that CAPTCHA input devices are best suited to 
First Person Shooters (FPS) and claim they also 
guarantee that the „aimbot‟ cheat, typically used in 
FPS, cannot be used. It could be argued that the 
player still has to control the avatar to some degree 
in order to make use of the aimbot which requires 
the interaction of the hardware device anyway, thus 
challenging this statement. 
 
The software proposal is a CAPTCHA token whose 
function is testing a player is indeed human and 
they estimate it is a lot cheaper than the hardware 
counterpart. Again no research has been done to 
ascertain this. It would be based upon standard 
cryptographic techniques and come in the form of 
an onscreen challenge in which the player has to 
press a number(s) on the keypad correctly to con-
tinue playing the game. These would appear at ran-
dom intervals during the game which, one would 
assume, would be frustrating to the game player. 
 
"CAPTCHA tokens require an interruption on the 
part of the player and thus appear most suitable for 
slow-paced games with very specific rules and low-
entropy inputs and outputs, such as card  and board 
games (chess, poker, etc)" Golle and Ducheneaut 
(2005). 
 
They do compare their implementations to others 
used in other two-factor authentication and so it 
would appear they have taken an idea and tried to 
improve upon it. They state they propose two 
broad approaches to help combat bots, but the term 
'broad' implies it will not work on all systems. They 
also state that they can distinguish bots from human 
players which is commendable, but they do not 
propose any solution as to what they will or can do 
once the bots are identified. 
2.2 Human Input Device's 
While Golle and Ducheneaut (2005) believe 
CAPTCHAs do provide a sound solution, Schluess-
ler et all (2007), contradict their proposal, finding 
through research that CAPTCHAs are limited to 
non-real time applications, Pao et all (2010). What 
Schluessler et all (2007) propose is a method which 
ensures data input actually enters a system through 
a physically present human input device (HID). The 
HID will detect whether data has been modified 
prior to its use with the aid of an input monitoring 
system. It works on the premise that the input data 
generated by the HID has to be the same as the in-
put data used by the game software. If they differ, 
then some form of illicit modification, insertion, or 
deletion occurred. The input monitoring system will 
compare the two data streams and if they differ in 
any way then a notification is sent to a remote ser-
vice provider (RSP). The prototype proposed can 
be implemented on any standard personal computer 
(PC) and the system architecture will change only 
slightly as the input monitoring system will come in 
the form of a firmware update but additional hard-
ware must be purchased in the form of hardware 
duplication filters. The authors alluded to the cost 
of these only stating it was moderate, a more specif-
ic figure would be beneficial to any persons con-
47 
 
templating this system. It has been designed initial-
ly to work with Intel® chipsets and so it is assumed 
the authors have not experimented with other chip-
sets. 
 
When a software application is started and elects to 
have the inputted data protected, a RSP is contacted 
and the application sends its inputconfiguration as 
well input devices allowed to connect,to the input 
verification service (IVS) within the firmware and 
the IVS then links up to the RSP. Each key press, 
mouse movement etc is passed through hardware 
input duplication filters and one data stream is sent 
to the game software and one to the IVS. The IVS 
then compares the two and if an attack is detected, 
determined by two different data streams, the IVS 
sends notification the RSP. This is sent over a se-
cure connection to prevent any sort of tampering, 
and so the connection has to provide message inte-
grity, authenticity, confidentiality and message dup-
lication detection. Once an attack is detected, all 
connected clients are notified of who is cheating 
and an on screen message is displayed stating who 
the cheater is. It is also possible to kick cheaters 
from game and ban them completely. 
 
The prototype which was built deviated from the 
initial design architecture to keep hardware costs 
down and because of this Schluessler et all (2007) 
could not implement such a system which was not 
vulnerable to circumvention, and this was one of 
the prerequisites for the system to be successful. As 
such the initial design cannot be verified. However 
the system they did test was successful in detecting 
input injection attacks. They decided to test it 
against the online game Quake 3 which is a FPS, 
using an Intel® x86 platform. The prototype de-
tected the use of an aimbot which automatically 
aims a user‟s weapon at the enemy. 
 
Although providing an initial successful implemen-
tation of their system, the authors do conclude that 
the answer to their papers title "Is a bot at the con-
trols" remains unanswered. This is because there 
are many questions which remain as the prototype 
was only tested on one specific machine against one 
specific game and the architecture deviated against 
the initial proposal. 
2.3 Human Observational Proofs 
A very similar scheme is one proposed by Gianvec-
chio et all (2009). They base their system of bot 
detection on Human Observational Proofs (HOPs) 
which is a form of an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS). According to their research it is difficult for 
a bot to perform certain actions in a human-like 
manner. The HOPs passively monitor input actions 
and compare them against a series of human user 
input traces already collected. In direct contrast to 
the HID system designed by Schluessler et all 
(2007), the proposed system actually lets a data 
stream pass through to the game server.Two com-
ponents are required: a client-side exporter and a 
server-side analyser. The exporter sends the users 
data stream for the exporter to analyse to decide if a 
bot is operating the client or not. A cascade neural 
network is at the core of the analyser, which 
„learns‟ the behaviours of human players. They 
have used a neural network as research shows that 
they perform well with user input data, Webb and 
Soh (2007). What the authors do not state is wheth-
er the neural network needs to be installed on each 
game server and then subsequently „learns‟ human 
behaviour or whether or not it can „learn‟ one per-
sons behaviour which can then be transferred to 
other servers and used as a basis for every player. 
They have not stated if it is the same for the bot 
behaviours. 
 
The authors devised a series of experiments under 
different configurations to gather information about 
different game bots and used different human play-
ers to give them enough scope to make a successful 
system within the parameters they propose, and 
were thorough in which user-input actions to 
record. Unlike the previous research, Schluessler et 
all (2007); they also used their system on two 
games, World of Warcraft and Diablo 2, and so 
could confidently state they had enough information 
to reach a definite conclusion. There research 
shows quite clearly in the form of charts how the 
input actions of a human and a bot differ and could 
be used as a visual referenceas proof of this as it is 
very precise. Unlike Schluessler et all (2007), and 
Golle and Ducheneaut (2005), what they do not 
state is what they would do once a cheat is detected. 
2.4   Player Behaviour Analysis 
A similar concept is proposed by Laurens et all 
(2007). They have designed a proof-of–concept 
system that detects cheats by monitoring player 
behaviour although the authors do state from the 
outset that that their evidence shows that their sys-
tem can only correctly distinguish most cheating 
from non-cheating players, not all, but it is a proof-
of-concept.  
 
They based  their system on CounterStrike: Source 
and specifically targeted wall-hacking. Again like 
Gianvecchio et all (2009), the authors state that 
players using cheats exhibit in-game behaviour 
which is very distinguishable from players who are 
not. 
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"A system based on behavioural analysis to detect 
cheating play promises significant advantages over 
current anti-cheat mechanisms" 
 (Laurens et all,  2007) 
 
This could be true and only if it works, again their 
system is a proof-of-concept but any good idea 
needs a starting point. However Gianvecchio et all 
(2009) have proven results based on two games, but 
unlike Gianvecchio et all (2009), the authors of this 
system devised their own algorithm based on results 
from game play to detect cheating play. To achieve 
the results they performed thorough experiments 
similar to Gianvecchio et all (2009), using players 
very experienced in gaming to eliminate the learn-
ing curve as to achieve a more accurate set of beha-
vioural results. Yet the authors do not relate to any 
other research on behavioural analysis and actually 
state that there appears to be very little academic 
research done in the field of online gaming security. 
This can be contested as scores of papers were 
found on this subject suggesting more could have 
been made of their idea if similar work was taking 
into consideration. 
 
Their concept is very similar to Schluessler et all 
(2007), the difference being the cheat detection 
system resides on the game server as a plug-in 
where it monitors the player‟s actions from within 
the game world. Communication takes place via an 
interaction layer with players‟ data being pulled in 
and traces performed upon the state of the game to 
determine the information required. The data is 
then formatted and then passed to the analysis en-
gine and then passed back to the game server to be 
acted upon. Again, unlike Schluessler et all (2007) 
and Golle and Duchneaut (2005), the authors do not 
state what happens if a cheating player is detected 
but do state in their „Future Work‟ segment that the 
scope of their work was to be limited and was de-
signed to demonstrate the feasibility of behavioural 
analysis to be implemented to gaming security. 
2.5  Trajectory-Based Player Behaviour Analy-
sis 
Chen et all (2008) take the concept of behavioural 
analysis and  propose a trajectory-based approach, 
which they believe can be applied to any game in 
which a player directly controls an avatar. Their 
theory is sound but they do not qualify this state-
ment with results from research. They used the 
game Quake 2,a FPS, which has a built-in game-
play recording function which can be used to recon-
struct the game and review each player‟s actions 
and movementsfrom any position and angle.. To 
represent diversity the authors only used traces that 
actual players contributed voluntarily. Using one 
map of Quake 2, they were able to plot the aggre-
gated navigation of each player. The same was 
done using three different bots in the game and the 
results were compared. The authors found that the 
pattern of the human players varied greatly to that 
of the bots, with the behavioural analysis, for ex-
ample, being that humans tended to keep next to 
walls when moving around the map so as not to 
expose themselves in open areas where they would 
most likely be shot by an enemy, unlike a bot who‟s 
reaction times would be quicker and would be able 
expose themselves in open ground for that exact 
reason. Also human players adjust their movements 
more continuously and slightly as they constantly 
move and spin round, side-to-side etc to detect 
enemies that happen upon them. This work appears 
to derive some good and valuable information. 
 
Using this the authors then used a framework to 
train a classifier which is then able to determine 
whether any given segment of an avatars trajectory 
is the result of a human player or a bot. The detec-
tion accuracy achieved results of 95% with traces 
longer than 200 seconds.With the type of bot used 
also being detected this is very commendable work 
and appears more accurate than the previous pro-
posals. 
3    Critical Evaluation 
All of the systems evaluated achieved varied results 
based around the same concept. The authors have 
proposed solutions but due to various reasons in-
cluding budget and time, could not fully test their 
systems on more than two games at any one time. 
What is interesting is the how similar the systems 
are, excluding Golle and Ducheneaut (2005), which 
would not work in real-time gaming. And it seems 
apparent that the potential flaws in one system 
could be overcome by using another. It could be 
possible to combine Schluessler et all (2007) with 
Gianvecchio et all (2009) as the user data carried 
by the client-side exporter in Gianvecchio et alls 
(2009) proposal could be tampered with  prior to it 
being sent to the server-side analyser. Implementing 
Schluessler et all (2007) idea would ensure that the 
data was indeed inputted by a human. If Chen et 
alls (2008) proposal could also be implemented 
then there would be indeed three layers of protec-
tion, but the burden on hardware resources could be 
considerable. Chen et all (2008), Gianvechhio et all 
(2009), Laurens et all (2007), Schluessler et all 
(2007) and Golle and Duchneaut (2005) have all 
stated the cost for their systems is minimal but only 
for their very specific scenarios, the actual cost to 
design such systems which would work across all 
platforms could be more. 
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4    Lessons to be Learnt 
The most obvious question arising from the re-
search is whether the proposed solutions would 
work on any other system and game aside from the 
actual ones used. Until, or indeed if further research 
is done using these methods the question will re-
main but progress has been made. With hacks de-
riving from security flaws at the design stage all of 
the proposed solutions merit further investigation 
by developers as the cost incurred in the research 
could be a lot less in comparison to revenue lost 
due to players abandoning games because of cheats. 
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An Empirical Study of Security Techniques Used In Online Banking 
 
Rajinder D G Singh 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to examine encryption methods used to achieving a 
secure environment in the banking sector. This paper discusses the encryption 
techniques of online security comprising the factors that compromise online banking 
security comprising key points that cause the vulnerability of users to phishing and 
malware threats in section 2, followed by the common security threats in e-banking in 
section 3. The evolution of encryption methods will be covered in section 4 which 
discuss the efforts taken by banks to improvise the online banking systems with the 
implementation of new technologies. Section 5 touches on some experimental work 
carried out by researchers in order to examine the strengths and weaknesses of 
authentication methods that have been executed by banks followed by section 6 that 
summarizes a comparative study to the encryption techniques being experimented on. 
Finally I conclude the usage of encryption techniques and some recommendations for 
banks and users towards achieving a better future in online banking in section 7. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Online transactions have been taking place since 
the early 19th century. Over time, the usage of 
internet for banking matters has grown amongst 
users that they find it efficient and a hassle free way 
to conduct their daily banking needs may it be pur-
chasing goods from virtual stores, fund transfers or 
paying bills. The popularity and usage of online 
banking has increased tremendously in the past few 
years thus marking the importance of security stan-
dards over the internet. Various encryption methods 
and technologies have been implemented since the 
start of online banking, however, comparably it has 
increased an alarming threat of fraud and identity 
theft amongst users. As early as 1984, there has 
been a surge of interest amongst active e-banking 
users about a number of computer break-ins 
[Haskett, 1984] thus jeopardizing the trust of users 
in performing transactions online. 
2 Factors That Contribute To E-
Banking Security Threats   
Banking activities over the internet platform are 
sensitive therefore higher security standards have 
become a necessity to curb the growing  
 
menace in the industry. Constant use of greater se-
curity technologies improves the level of secure 
banking contradictorily affecting the usability of the 
product and services (Holbl, 2008). According to 
Haskett (1984), break-ins were caused by novel 
users using dial-up facilities to hack into computers 
by guessing combinations of user id and password 
on a repeated basis (Haskett, 1984).  
 
“While the battle between those who would have 
tight security and those who want simpler (user-
friendly) log-ins continues, some of us find our-
selves needing an immediately implementable 
system...” (Haskett, 1984).  
 
It was studied that one of the reasons hackers were 
on the large at that point in time was caused by 
customer mentality of wanting a system that can 
simply be accessed without having to remember 
long combinations of passwords. Commonly, most 
users prefer having short passwords than long 
nonsense alphanumeric characters to enable them to 
remember passwords easily rather than walking 
around with a notebook full of passwords to various 
secured sites.  
 
Besides choosing short and easy manageable pass-
word, users tend to reuse their passwords across 
various platforms. “...people accumulated more 
accounts but did not create more passwords” (Gaw 
et al. 2006).  
 
The number of passwords people use is not at par 
with the number of online bank accounts that they 
have which makes it easier for attackers to crack the 
code and have access to not only one account but to 
all accounts associated with that particular 
password. In addition to that, Gaw et al (2006) also 
claimed that reuse of passwords was a major 
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problem amongst users where they used a single 
password for multiple bank accounts. 
3 Common Security Threats in 
Online Banking 
The most known attacks in the online banking 
industry are the Trojan attacks, phishing attacks and 
the MitM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks. In the 
Trojan attack scenario, the attacker sends out 
emails to user accounts convincing them to open a 
specific site. When the site is visited, the website 
automatically installs the virus on the user‟s 
computer. The Trojan then sits in the system and 
observes the computer activities and gets into 
action as soon as the user begins an online banking 
session. When a transaction is made, the virus 
invisibly changes the amount and destination of the 
transaction not known to the user (AlZomai et al. 
2008). 
 
Phishing attacks are done by tricking users into 
revealing their banking account details (Peng et al. 
2010). For instance, an email from L1odys is 
impersonated to convince a user that it actually sent 
from a genuine server. The change of „l‟ to „1‟ is 
hardly visible at one glance, making it difficult for 
the user to notice the attack. The user therefore 
opens the email which leads him to a dummy 
Lloyds bank web page. As soon as the user inputs 
his username and password, the attacker is able to 
record the details and the account is hacked in no 
time.  
 
In the man-in-middle scenario, the attacker 
potentially tends to sit between the bank server and 
the user and impersonate them both. This kind of 
activity is known as pharming (Berghel, 2006). The 
man-in-middle can act as both the bank and the user 
therefore making it next to impossible to detect any 
faults by both parties where the bank thinks it‟s a 
genuine user and the user thinks it‟s a legitimate 
bank website. 
4 The Evolution of Encryption 
Techniques of Online Banking 
The password technique is a greenhorn method 
used more than twenty years ago where a user is 
required to enter passwords with combinations of 
alphabets and numbers to access a secure banking 
site. The loop holes in this method were soon 
noticed by the intruders where they only had to 
guess a combination of usernames and passwords 
randomly till they found a matching pair. Keeping 
that into consideration, this technique only allowed 
three attempts of inserting a correct combination of 
username and passwords. If an account is indeed 
accessed by an intruder, on the fourth attempt he is 
automatically redirected to a dummy webpage that 
appears to be a genuine one. The intruder therefore 
thinks he‟s successful in cracking the code but 
where in actual sense, he isn‟t. The motive of this 
technique was to create confusion amongst hackers 
where they believe they were on the right track but 
they were not. Failure to login on several counts on 
a frequent basis can lead to hacker trap, if desirable 
(Botting, 1986). 
 
In order to overcome the problem of having users to 
remember long passwords a technique known as 
secondary passwords was introduced (also known 
as supersets of Pass-algorithms). This technique is 
used by providing passwords along with the one 
provided by the vendor of a particular operating 
software of a system. Pass-algorithms are 
affordable, easy to install and maintain. Moreover it 
requires no alterations to the operating system 
therefore it makes it a hassle free process for both 
the provider and the users. According to Haskett 
(1984), this scheme allows enforces and system 
administrator to collect site dependant information 
about any attempted break-ins. 
 
According to Holbl (2008), most banks have 
adopted the two-factor authentication approach that 
is basically gets information from what the users 
know (passwords) and what they have (security 
device). Though the actual implementation of this 
method may vary among banks worldwide, but the 
basic idea of this authentication technique is the 
same. Along with the static password that users use 
to access their online accounts, all transactions 
performed will require the second part of the 
authentication which may be a PIN/code on their 
security device or cell phones that were registered 
during the opening of the account. This code is 
known as the one-time-password approach. This 
approach is currently used by the Barclays Bank in 
the UK and also some banks in Malaysia, German 
and the Scandinavian countries (Holbl, 2008). 
 
The two-factor authentication method was backed 
up by Nilsson (2005), when she talked about: 1) 
Security Box, which works with a dynamic 
password and 2) Fixed Passwords which means 
having one constant or static password (Nilsson et 
al. 2005). The security box method simply means 
that users are provided by dynamic passwords on a 
device (e.g. cell phones or smartcard readers) that 
users receive a unique transaction code on. This 
code coupled with the user‟s password is used to 
login and perform transaction over the internet. 
Where else in the fixed passwords method, a user is 
provided with a code upon registering at the bank 
for the first time. This code is static and users use 
the same code together with their passwords to 
perform online transactions overtime which is used 
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by Lloyds TSB, UK. The security box type of 
authentication is known to be safer than the fixed 
passwords method because a unique password is 
generated each time users try to login their online 
bank accounts. The unique code is dynamic and 
different each time it‟s sent out from the server. The 
„fixed password‟ method is used by some financial 
institutions in the United Kingdom where else most 
Sweden banks use the „security box‟ method. 
 
Another form of classification in the two-factor 
approach is the certificate-based-approach, where a 
license is used as a second validation factor. This 
certificate requires PKIs (Public Key 
Infrastructures) which can be stored in any physical 
storage device (e.g. USB stick or smart card) 
(Holbl, 2008). This method is known to be cheap 
and easy to use. This approach can be classified as 
a timer-based-password approach where it‟s used 
by the banks to providers of services like Paypal 
and eBay (Holbl, 2008). This method is used using 
hardware generators where the password generated 
for a particular transaction lasts for a certain time 
only (e.g. 60 seconds) thus limiting intruder 
activities. The final classification of the two-factor 
authentication approach is the certificate-smartcard 
based approach. This approach requires a specific 
card reader that can be used to store certificates or 
to generate one time passwords. All transactions are 
recorded on the smart card therefore chances of 
identity stealing in the Trojan attacks are equal to 
zero. Although this method has its benefits and is 
safe to use, it is rarely used by banks around the 
world due to its expensive cost. “There is not a 
single bank that makes such an approach 
mandatory” (Holbl, 2008). 
 
Where some researchers talked about secure login 
and transactions, Alzomai et al. (2008) expressed 
that data security is also an essential key point to 
online banking. The team claimed that there are two 
types of authentication that are important in online 
banking. They are: 1) user authentication and 2) 
data origin authentication. He stressed that data 
authentication is as equally as important as user 
authentication. It is important to be within genuine 
web pages throughout the transaction process right 
from the user login until the transactions are 
completed. It is important to generate data from a 
genuine provider and that the data is not tampered 
with to ensure data integrity. It is of no use if a user 
logs in safely and protects his data but the site that 
he is accessing is not a genuine one. The impact is 
of no less than a stolen user identity. Therefore, a 
typical method for data origin discussed was the 
OTP (one-time-password) for every transaction. 
This method is similar to the one discussed 
previously where the transaction not only requires 
the normal user passwords but also requires a 
hardware token that can generate one-time-
authorization code with limited validity time. The 
OTP implementation can be of different ways (e.g. 
security boxes, hardware tokens or SMS messages 
through mobile devices). 
 
Li et al. (2010) studied another method known as 
CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing 
test to tell Computers and Human Apart). A text 
CAPTCHA is shown below:  
 
 
 
 
 
CAPTCHA (Image: Courtesy of Li et al. 2010) 
 
This method is deployed at the login level and the 
transactions level. CAPTCHAs are mainly used to 
prevent automated MitM (Man-in-the-Middle) 
attackers (Li et al. 2010). Many banks around the 
world have deployed this technique alongside their 
existing security methods to make it harder for 
malicious programs to manipulate transactions. 
Unlike the OTP, this solution does not base on any 
physical device thus making it cost effective to 
maintain and implement for both banks and its 
users. The principle of CAPTCHA is that pattern 
recognition tasks are tremendously tricky for 
computers but simple for humans (Li et al. 2010).  
 
Some of the methods mentioned above are further 
discussed in the following sections based on 
experiments conducted by different researchers. 
5 Experimental Research and Results 
The first two experiments discussions are done on 
the bank‟s end and the third experiment is done 
based on a user‟s viewpoint towards secure online 
banking.  
 
As mentioned earlier, to achieve a certain standard 
of online security, greater technologies have been 
implemented which affects the usability of an 
online banking. AlZomai et al. (2008) conducted an 
experiment on the two-factor authentication 
approach focusing on the one-time-password (OTP) 
method using email instead of SMSs that required 
cell phones. The study was carried out on a group 
of students from Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT), Australia which consist of 
undergraduate students, master students and PhD 
research students including staff on campus and non 
QUT participants. The experiment was to examine 
the usability of the SMS authentication scheme 
(AlZomai et al. 2008). The participants varied from 
different faculties (law, education and IT) within 
the university and aged between 20 and 40. A 
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dummy online bank simulator was created and 
participants were asked to perform transactions on 
the simulator. While the participants were doing 
their transactions, two simulated attacks were 
carried out namely the Trojan attack and the man-
in-the-middle attack. The results showed that out of 
53 attacks sent out, 42 were discovered by 
participants and the transactions were therefore 
cancelled. This means that 79% of possible obvious 
attacks were successfully avoided. In a separate 
method of sending out attacks, only 39% of stealthy 
attacks were managed to be blocked. The OTP 
codes were sent via email rather than the SMS 
system where in real world banking; mostly all 
banks use the SMS systems or a security device 
alternatively. Although the avoided attacks success 
rates were high, the accuracy of results cannot be 
relied on 100 percent as emails are more likely to 
spread viruses and phishing activities compared to 
SMS systems. This experiment therefore concludes 
that the one-time-passwords sent via emails are not 
the best solution to online banking security.  
 
Apart from that, Li et al. (2010) carried out an 
experiment to test the strengths of CAPTCHA 
solutions by deploying practical real time attacks on 
various CAPTCHA schemes used by banks in 
Germany and China using image processing and 
pattern recognition tools. These CAPTCHA 
breaking tools are technically run on specific 
mathematical formulas. The results showed that 
automated programs could recognize each and 
every character even better than humans when the 
distorted text was well segmented (Chellipah et al. 
2005). The results returned an alarming success rate 
of 100% of breaking CAPTHCAs. Therefore it can 
be concluded that CAPTCHA solutions do not meet 
the expected security requirements in real world 
banking.  
 
Nilsson et al. (2005) however took a different 
approach in examining encryption techniques from 
a user‟s perspective. The team conducted a survey 
on 40 participants in Sweden to test the „security 
box‟ method and 40 participants in UK on „fixed 
password‟ systems. The questionnaire comprised of 
questions encompassing four major aspects; trust, 
authentication, location and control (Nilsson et al. 
2005). The findings showed that the first three 
factors significantly influenced online banking 
users with an average of more than 3.7 points for 
„location‟ on a likert scale of 1 till 5 for both the 
methods used. This concludes that trust and 
authentication of users in a particular online 
webpage depends on the location of where they are 
accessing the webpage from. A user accessing his 
online account from a cyber cafe is more likely to 
be exposed to virtual threats than a user accessing 
his account from a home PC. 
 
6 Comparative Conclusion on 
Experimental Study 
The experiment done by AlZomai et al. (2008) on 
One-Tine-Password methods returned high results 
of users being able to avoid security attacks. This 
study was narrowed down on a specific number of 
participants within an organization. Users 
performing transactions from dummy accounts on 
simulated WebPages were not sensitive to the 
nature of real world banking that involves actual 
personal funds. Therefore I conclude that this study 
did not return reliable results based on the scope of 
the experiment and the platform used to deliver 
OTPs which in this case is through emails. 
Moreover, CAPTCHAs on the other hand were 
proven to be weak and could be broken into using 
carefully designed mathematical formulas by Li et 
al. (2010). Neither methods proved to solve e-
banking issues efficiently thus increasing the 
necessity of a thorough study to reveal best 
methods possible to achieve safe and secure online 
banking. Although the OTP encryption method is 
most commonly used by banks around the world, it 
has not been proven that the security attacks via this 
method is zero. Besides, user experience and 
knowledge on security issues also plays a major 
role in the banking industry. 
 
7 Conclusions  
The nature of online banking security is sensitive as 
this type of transaction over the internet is always 
susceptible to security threats. Various methods 
were studied and examined by different researchers 
on various aspects of e-banking security around the 
world. The results however were not as promising 
considering the platforms on which e-banking 
operates. The e-banking security has to be 
meticulously evaluated in order to achieve the high 
level security standards of banking online. E-
banking security is yet to be improved to overcome 
malicious programs and curb other invisible 
attacks.  
 
The usability factor should also be kept into 
consideration while upgrading and implementing 
safer security technologies in order to ease online 
transaction amongst users.  
 
Apart from the banks assessing new technologies to 
withstand particular attacks, users equally hold 
importance in enhancing online banking security 
and keeping their accounts as safe as possible. 
Users should take measure to educate themselves 
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about possible attacks and how attackers operate on 
their paroles. 
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A Critical Study on Proposed Firewall Implementation Methods in 
Modern Networks 
 
Loghin Tivig 
 
Abstract 
 The world‟s economy faces a high dependency of Internet and computer 
systems. The need for data protection solutions has increased along with the 
development of internet based systems. The firewall is one of the most important 
tools created to protect a system or a computer network from outside attacks. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse and critical evaluate some of the existing and 
some of the proposed firewall implementation techniques that apply to various 
types of networks. The paper also suggests several practical approaches to 
efficient implementation and structuring of firewalls for companies in order to 
reduce time, expenditure and in the same time to increase the standard of 
security in their networks, based on the testing proofs presented in the research 
papers studied. The conclusion sustains that researchers have managed to find 
effective solutions of firewall implementation that can be applied by companies 
in order to benefit of high standard security at reduced costs.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
In order to benefit of protection, confidentiality, 
integrity and availability, networks can be 
protected by firewall applications. The firewall 
represents the barrier between a trusted 
network/system and an untrusted one. Due to 
increasing network speed and traffic, the 
firewall software needs to evolve in order to be 
able to confer a good quality of service. The 
transfer of data packages between 
networks/systems is analysed following sets of 
rules and if the package complies with the rules 
the transfer is allowed. Modern firewalls must 
perform more than applying these rules; they 
also need to act as protection against viruses, 
different types of attack and to monitor all the 
data traffic. Basically the good functionality of 
the firewall is set by how good the rules policy 
is: if it‟s too permissive the network is unsecure 
and if it‟s too restrictive, traffic that should have 
access is denied. Having a good policy is not 
enough. Too much data can produce a huge 
queue and data packages are permitted without a 
valid inspection giving the possibility of an 
outside attack. The modern mobile applications 
that use the Internet can become gateways into 
the network and increase the risks of attack. The 
development of e-commerce has led to a 
necessity for having security rules that every 
company using this type of commerce needs to 
comply with. This is in order to protect financial 
information used in these transactions (e.g. 
credit cards details, bank accounts), typically 
targeted by hackers. These companies must 
respect security standards like Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) or 
Sarbanes Oxley (Garlick 2009). Developers 
have tried to change the common way of 
thinking in creating firewalls, some of them 
getting ideas from nature like “Ant Colony 
Optimization based approach” (Sreelaja and 
Vijayalakshmi Pai 2010) or “Modeling firewalls 
by (Tissue-like) P Systems” (Leporati  and 
Ferretti 2010). A different approach was to 
verify packets transfers by using multiple 
firewalls at the same time either in parallel or in 
series (Khalil et al. 2010). The latest software 
product in security matters is the Intrusion 
Prevention System (IPS) or Intrusion Detection 
and Prevention System (IDPS). This type of 
software monitors the traffic and activities 
within the network or system in order to prevent 
an attack using signature-based detection 
methods, statistical anomaly-base detection and 
also stateful protocol analysis detection. Later in 
this paper it will be discussed the idea of 
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creating a firewall‟s simple structure to match 
the Network Intrusion Detection System 
capabilities.  
2 Background 
The problems related to protection through 
using firewalls emerge from continuous 
evolution of computer networks. The amount of 
data transferred inside a network along with new 
versions of harmful software and changing 
strategies used by hackers ask for a constant 
need of regular updates. 
Many companies consider that having an older 
version of firewalls will protect them against 
threats but the reality is different: hackers are 
most of the time one step ahead the current 
protection software, so developers also must to 
keep up with them by creating new products or 
updating old versions (Garlick 2009). The 
appearance of Wi-Fi networks and Smart phones 
has created the need of a new firewall strategy to 
be implemented in this type of networks.  
 
As state by Strohmeyer (2009) in PC World 
magazine that some people use to believe there 
is no need to install firewall software on their 
devices because the Wi-Fi router already has a 
built-in firewall. The article clarifies that in fact, 
the router has a built-in firewall but it protects 
only against port scanners, and the main risk of 
getting your device infected with malicious 
software is the downloading of information. 
This is where the need of protection software 
like firewalls should be installed on a device. 
 
According to Chris King (2011), from Palo Alto 
Networks, using the IP port 80 associated with 
HTTP transfer gives the possibility of dangerous 
packages to go through because the traffic is 
always allowed by the firewall‟s rules. The 
solution he proposes is to analyse the 
applications and also the port used and the 
packet to be allowed only if the user has the 
right credentials. The same problem applies to 
HTTPS networking protocol. 
 
The problems identified can be classified in 
three categories: costs, performances and type of 
network. The small to medium size businesses 
cannot afford the high prices for the latest 
products‟ releases on the market. More costly 
effective solutions of firewall systems must be 
developed and in the same time, these products 
must offer a level of protection comparative 
with other more expensive products existing on 
the market. In the aspect of performance there is 
a need of techniques that can deal with high 
volume of data transfer for large companies‟ 
use. The different architecture of Wi-Fi 
networks also requires new firewall systems that 
can adapt to their demands. 
3 Literature Review 
For the problems listed above, many solutions 
have been proposed in the literature and some of 
them will be analyzed in the following 
paragraphs of this paper. 
3.1 MANET Networks 
“A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a self-
organizing network of mobile routers and 
associated hosts connected by wireless links” 
(Suman et al. 2010).  
The increasing number of devices Wi-Fi 
compatible like Smart phones, computers, 
printers etc. creates large networks, especially in 
public places, and a growing demand of security 
solutions for this type of networks. One of the 
primary protections is the existence of built-in 
firewall software in network routers but these 
firewalls only prevent port scanner attacks and 
cannot protect against malicious software 
(Strohmeyer 2008). 
 
Research has been carried out in this domain to 
solve security problems and a proposed 
technique for MANET networks is to randomly 
change the firewall router after a fixed amount 
of time in order to make more complicate 
finding an entry in the network in a case of 
outside attack (Suman et al. 2010). The authors 
claim that their technique will increase the 
security in MANET networks. A graphical 
representation of the method‟s functionality is 
presented in figure 1. In this case every device 
within the network must be able and willing to 
act as a firewall. The authors claim that this 
method will confer a much better security for 
these types of networks.  
 
Although this concept is a revolutionary one and 
might help increasing the security for MANET, 
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functionality has been demonstrated using a 
series of mathematical calculation. For specific 
values and in a certain situation the authors 
make obvious the efficiency of their theory. The 
mathematical demonstrations sustain their 
claims in a “perfect” network. In the real world 
there is no such a thing as perfect network, 
because devices can develop a multitude of 
problems, so to demonstrate the efficiency and 
advantages that this implementation might bring, 
a series of tests must be performed. The 
networks to be used in these experiments must 
contain a large variety of devices in order to 
analyze how each one of them will act. A 
problem that could be encountered is to create 
the firewall software in such a way to be 
compatible with all the wireless platforms and 
operating systems currently existing. The 
devices‟ battery power is also an important 
factor that should be considered.  
 
Therefore, as the authors admit in their 
conclusion, more research is needed for this 
technique to become usable (Suman et al.  
2010). 
 
3.2 Parallel Firewalls 
A proposed solution that claims to reduce time 
and speed up the data packages verifications is 
the use of multiple parallel firewalls. According 
to Khalil et al. (2010), this technique has proved 
to be extremely efficient. The claims have been 
confirmed by testing different implementations 
of firewall protection and comparing the results. 
In order to test their experiment the following 
hardware and software resources have been 
used: Microsoft parallel firewalls (ISA) with a 
constant number of 3000 rules policy, Virtual 
Personal Network (VPN) and also Cisco 6500 
switches with Network Load Balancing (NLB). 
Tests have been performed for the following 
cases: 
 No firewall. 
 Standalone firewall without VPN. 
 Standalone firewall with VPN. 
 Enterprise edition ISA integrated with 
NLB for only internal without VPN. 
 Enterprise edition ISA integrated with 
NLB for only internal with VPN. 
 Enterprise edition ISA integrated with 
NLB for only internal & external 
without VPN. 
 Enterprise edition ISA integrated with 
NLB for only internal & external with 
VPN. 
 Two standalone firewalls with two Cisco 
6500 switch with HSRP enabled 
without VPN. 
 Two standalone firewalls with two Cisco 
6500 switch with HSRP enabled with 
VPN. 
 
For each one of the above cases it has been 
recorded and compared the following results:  
processor usage, the amount of data transferred, 
time and bandwidth usage. The conclusion of all 
these experiments is that using their proposed 
technique (two standalone firewalls with two 
Cisco 6500 switch with HSRP enabled) the best 
results can be achieved for any of both cases, 
with or without VPN. 
 
The experiment is descriptive giving the 
possibility to be easily repeated by anyone 
interested in this aspect. Considering the wide 
range of tests performed, there is enough 
evidence to accept the claims made for the 
specific case presented.  A concerning fact in 
this approach is the cost of its implementation. 
Having parallel firewalls could be an 
improvement in speed and quality but because 
of high cost it might not be applicable to 
companies with small budget. Further tests of 
this concept can be performed using different 
firewall products and implementing this 
technique in a real world company network to 
see what level of improvement and service 
Figure 1 Flowchart of random selection 
of firewall (Suman et al., 2010) 
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quality can be gained in comparison with the 
existing system. 
3.3 Filter and Firewall Automatic 
Cooperation 
One of the latest network protection techniques 
is the use of IPS (Intrusion Prevention Systems). 
These systems incorporate existing technologies 
like firewall, antivirus and intrusion detection 
software. The problem of IPS is the cost of 
implementation because they require expensive 
hardware. For medium to large size companies 
this might not be an issue, but for small 
companies this solution can be unaffordable. 
In their research Shirazi and Salehi (2009), 
demonstrate that the same standards of security 
can be achieved using a much more cost 
effective solution. The proposed technique is the 
use of NIDS (Network Based IDS) integrated 
with Packet filtering. The experiment was 
performed using Snort NIDS and a simple 
firewall created in IPTABLES. The results 
obtained after running intrusion attacks against 
the experimental protection demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the method. Although the 
experiment has been performed on a Linux 
platform, using XML for communication 
between NIDS and firewall means that this type 
of implementation can be extended on other 
platforms. 
 
The schema and all the necessary details are 
well explained in the paper leading to an easy 
remake of the experiment. Their theory is more 
interesting because for the test performed, it has 
been used common applications and the whole 
implementation doesn‟t necessary need 
expensive hardware and software resources. The 
fact that Snort is an open source detection 
system and IPTABLES a common Linux tool 
makes this research a practical solution for low 
budget companies due to the reduced costs of its 
implementation. The experiment had good 
results in the case presented and sustain the 
claims made by the authors. Further tests should 
be performed in the matter of attack diversity. 
Also a comparison between IPS and this type of 
implementation could reveal some useful 
information about the level of security each of 
the methods provides. Considering the variety of 
operating system used, a continuation of this 
research would be the development of software 
compatible with all major operating systems. 
3.4 Network Processor Solution 
A method proposed to speed up the filtering 
process is network processor solution. This 
method targets the data transfers between two of 
the most used types of network: WAN and 
LAN.  It can be defined as a “hybrid firewall 
architecture that independently leverages the 
control and data path capabilities available in 
the network processors” (Seong-Hwan Kim et 
al.  2010).  
The technical details of functionality are 
presented in figure 2. 
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For this experiment it has been used the 
APP2200 device. The results of the performed 
comparison between this kind of implementation 
and the traditional firewall implementation 
demonstrate that the proposed solution, in the 
specific scenario presented, provides better 
results. The details of the test presented has a 
lack of information regarding the conditions and 
equipment used making the results open to 
questions regarding the connection between 
hardware / software capacities of the system and 
the results. Based on the evidences provided, it 
only can be assumed that this implementation 
targets complex networks and it requires 
powerful hardware resources.  
The output of the test makes known that using 
the proposed method the transfer between WAN 
and LAN is much faster in any of the cases: with 
firewall enabled or disabled. Based on these 
results the authors concluded that “This model 
provides consistent and predictable high 
throughput performance for the traffic while 
retaining the flexibility offered by a general-
purpose CPU architecture”. (Seong-Hwan Kim 
et al. 2010) 
3.5 Ant Colony Optimization 
In their research N. K. Sreelaja et al. (2010) 
present a new bio-mimetic technique inspired 
from the ant colony architecture which helps 
filtering in the firewall rule set. The proposed 
solution targets general implementation of 
firewalls rules. Efficiency of this approach has 
been demonstrated by performing a diversity of 
case studies. The authors have developed an 
algorithm that has been presented in pseudo-
code format and they have used that algorithm 
for a variety of situations. The functionality is 
well explained including complete mathematical 
calculations for every case considered. The 
research contains also results of comparison 
between this type of method and the major 
existing methods in targeted area.  
 
In terms of mathematical demonstration, the 
overall research is descriptive and well 
performed but there is a lack of information 
about a real experiment. The theoretical 
advantages sustain the authors‟ claims, but in 
order to demonstrate the effectiveness of this 
solution, practical tests must be performed. 
Also, there is no specification about the type and 
performances of the hardware and software 
resources that must be used and also the cost of 
implementation and maintenance. A further 
study must be performed in these fields in order 
to convince companies to adopt this approach. 
Figure 2 Network processor implementation (Seong-Hwan Kim, et al., 2010) 
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3.6 Tissue-like Model 
Based on the similarity between P system rules 
and firewall rules a research has been carried 
out by Leporati and Ferretti. (2010) in finding a 
solution to use the tissue-like P system as an 
instrument to create and examine security 
properties of firewall. The aim of this technique 
is to help network administrators to test the 
filtering rules before implementation, in a faster 
way. The practical outcome targeted, is a 
reduced cost and fewer problems in system‟s 
implementation. The authors claim that this 
approach of using P system has never been 
studied in the literature and what seems to be a 
huge problem in the existing firewalls‟ rules 
creation methods can be easily fixed using the 
proposed tissue-like model. Functionality has 
been proved using a complex mathematical 
demonstration which brings enough evidence to 
sustain the authors‟ claims. The lack of 
information about a practical implementation 
and testing makes the method just a possible 
solution for the problems intended to solve. 
3.7 Firewall Strategies for Businesses 
For current companies it is critical to implement 
a firewall security. Their management must find 
a balance between performance, security and 
administration for a successful implementation 
of firewall to protect the networks and system 
they use and also to keep the software up to 
date. The rules applied should be optimized and 
the firewall must not be loaded with extra-
services. In the event of replacing the firewall 
product, the use of special packages for 
analyzing the base rule is critical. Firewall 
platforms that allow this type of technology, can 
use a connection acceleration to speed up the 
traffic. In order to increase the network speed 
sometimes the administrators tend to use 
dangerous modification like reducing the level 
of encryption, disabling the logging for all 
services or switching off the TCP stateful 
inspection. Allowing third-party connectivity 
without authentication and encryption is also a 
common practice. All these things can put the 
network at a high risk, therefore must be 
avoided. (Garlic 2009). 
 
Maskey et al. (2007) present a template firewall 
configuration that can be used as a starting point 
by companies or institutions as a low budget 
solution. Because the mentioned paper presents 
a basic firewall configuration for teaching and 
learning purposes a complete analysis of the 
method has not been performed. 
4 Conclusions 
The firewall has become a primary tool in the 
fight against viruses and hackers attacks. Due to 
the high levels of security it provides, the 
majority of Internet users, including companies 
and institutions have chosen to use a firewall 
product. Looking at the examples presented in 
this paper it is obvious the continuity of new 
firewall methods research as response to 
progress of network technologies, diversity of 
harmful software, hackers‟ attacks and the huge 
amount of data transfer. Based on the problems 
identified, this paper has analysed and presented 
existing solutions that can be adopted by 
companies. The methods studied above solve 
problems like costs of implementation, data 
transfer and methods for Wi-Fi networks. In 
some of the cases more research is needed for 
the proposed methods to become feasible 
solutions ready to be used.  
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